The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws by Pham, Huyen
Texas A&M University School of Law 
Texas A&M Law Scholarship 
Faculty Scholarship 
3-2008 
The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws 
Huyen Pham 
Texas A&M University School of Law, hpham@law.tamu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 Geo. L.J. 777 (2008). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/91 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 




I. THE SCOPE OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT ...................... 782
A. DEFINING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT ....................... 782
B. THE EXPANDING REACH OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT .............. 785
1. Employm ent ................................. 787
2. H ousing .................................... 791
3. Transportation ..................................... 793
4. Future Areas for Private Enforcement ................. 796
a. Education ............................... 796
b. M edical Care ............................. 798
c. Charity and Other Services .................... 800
II. AN EFFECTIVE IMMIGRATION LAW POLICY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  800
A. DEFINING CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION ........................ 800
B. EVALUATING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT ........................ 802
1. Impact on Illegal Immigration .................... 803
a. Federal Employer Sanctions .................. 803
b. Private Enforcement Laws ................... 810
i. Pull of Market Forces ................... 810
ii. Enforcement Challenges ................. 810
iii. Local Effect, No National Impact ........... 814
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; A.B., 1992 Harvard
College; J.D., 1996 Harvard Law School. © 2008, Huyen Pham. I had the opportunity to present this
paper at the 2007 Conference for Asian Pacific American Law Faculty and at the SMU Dedham School
of Law Junior Faculty Workshop, where I received very helpful feedback. I thank Keith Aoki, Michael
Green, Neil Gotanda, Tom Joo, Chunlin Leonhardt, Peggy McGuinness, Michael A. Olivas, Joseph
Thai, John Torok, and Rose Cuison Villazor for their thoughtful comments. I am particularly grateful to
Gabriel (Jack) Chin and Hiroshi Motomura for their suggestions and encouragement and to Margaret
Thompson for her excellent research assistance.
778 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 96:777
2. Punitive Effect ............................... 815
a. Federal Employer Sanctions .................. 815
b. Private Enforcement Laws ................... 816
3. Symbolic Impact ............................. 817
a. Federal Employer Sanctions .................. 817
b. Private Enforcement Laws ................... 818
4. The Costs ................................... 819
a. Federal Employer Sanctions .................. 820
i. Administrative Costs ...................... 820
ii. Discrimination Costs .................... 821
b. Private Enforcement Laws ................... 825
i. Administrative Costs .................... 825
ii. Discrimination Costs .................... 825
CONCLUSION . ............................................ 826
INTRODUCTION
In 2002, Greyhound Lines started warning its employees not to sell tickets
"to anyone you know or believe to be an illegal alien." To identify illegal aliens,
the bus company instructed employees to look out for large groups of people
traveling together, who are led by a guide, and are "moving in single file." To
identify smugglers, employees were told to listen for the Spanish word "pol-
lito"-a diminutive of the word for chicken, what smugglers call their clients-
and other terms. The employees were instructed not to engage in racial profiling
or other illegal discrimination, but they were also told that they could be
terminated, arrested, or both for selling tickets to undocumented passengers.
Finally, employees were warned: "the Company and/or the government is
watching and listening to you!"'
Greyhound instituted this employee training to avoid prosecution under a
federal law that makes it a crime to transport an undocumented person, "know-
ing or in reckless disregard" of the person's illegal immigration status. 2 This
1. Leslie Berestein & Norma de la Vega, Bus Company Policy Irks Latino Groups: Ticket Sellers.
Told To Deny Service to Apparent Illegals, SAN DIEGo UNION-TRm., Sept. 23, 2005, at Al; see also
Michael Marizco, Greyhound Staffers Face Job Loss if Entrants Ride, ARiz. DAiLY STAR, Sept. 23,
2005, at Al.
2. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 274(a)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2000). In
2001, the now-defunct Golden State Transportation Company, a commercial bus company based in Los
Angeles, pled guilty to charges that it transported an estimated 42,100 illegal immigrants within the
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law is just one of a growing number of laws, federal and local, that shifts the
burden of enforcing immigration laws onto private parties-employers, bus
companies and other carriers, and landlords.3 Under these laws, private parties
are obligated to insure that they provide their goods and services only to those
who are legally present in the United States (or in the case of employers, that
employees they hire are legally present and authorized-to work). 4 Private parties
who fail to meet that responsibility face civil and criminal penalties. 5
To be sure, the lion's share of immigration enforcement still rests with
government authorities.6 But there is a growing trend to shift some enforcement
responsibilities onto private parties. With the passing of the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),7 Congress took the significant step of
requiring employers to check the immigration status of all employees in order to
verify their work eligibility.8 For the first time nationwide, private parties were
required to deny a benefit-here, employment-based on immigration status. In
effect then, IRCA required employer's to enforce the employment provisions of
federal immigration laws.
In the twenty-one years since IRCA (late 1986 to late 2007), Congress, state
legislatures, and even local city councils have passed laws that have required
various private parties to enforce immigration laws. The trend has accelerated
post-9/11, as immigration policy has been increasingly tied to national security.
Motivated by concerns that illegal immigration is running rampant and that the
nation is losing control of its borders, legislative branches at all levels have
conscripted private parties to join government authorities in enforcing immigra-
tion laws.
The reach of private enforcement laws into such varied sectors is startling.
On the employment front, in addition to the sanctions contained in IRCA,
employers in a growing number of cities and counties also risk losing their
business licenses, government contracts, and other government benefits if they
hire undocumented workers. 9 As mentioned earlier, public carriers like Grey-
hound face civil and criminal penalties for transporting undocumented persons
within the United States. In the most recent manifestation of private enforce-
ment, landlords in cities across the United States face daily fines as high as
nation's interior, using circuitous routes to avoid Border Patrol checkpoints. For more about Golden
State and the impact of its prosecution, see infra notes 93 to 98 and accompanying text.
Greyhound modified its policy after immigrants' rights groups raised concerns about the racial-
profiling implications of the policy. See infra notes 95 to 98 and accompanying text.
3. Also, legislatures have or are considering imposing enforcement obligations on medical care
providers, educators, and charities. See infra section I.B.4.
4. Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
5. For detailed information about private enforcement laws, including penalties, see infra Part II.
6. Some state and local governments have also started enforcing immigration laws. See infra note
20.
7. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
8. INA § 274A(b)(l), 8 U.S.C. §1324a(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
9. See infra section II.B. 1.
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$1000 if they rent their properties to undocumented tenants. 10 And legislatures
across the country have or are considering laws that would impose private
enforcement duties on educators, medical care providers, and charities. 1
Though they vary in their jurisdiction and the penalties they impose, these
laws share a common characteristic: they all impose a legal duty on private
individuals or institutions to enforce immigration laws. These private persons
are required to check the immigration status of persons seeking a restricted
benefit (for example, employment or housing) and to deny that benefit if the
person is present in the United States without legal immigration status.
Proponents of private enforcement emphasize its multiplier effect. Instead of
limiting immigration law enforcement to the ranks of government officers,
proponents argue that private enforcement spreads enforcement duties to private
individuals, multiplying the number of immigration law enforcers without
adding significant costs. With more enforcement, advocates say, illegal immigra-
tion will decrease, as more unauthorized immigrants are deported, voluntarily
return home, or are deterred from trying to immigrate in the first place.
According to its proponents, private enforcement also has the additional benefits
of penalizing private enforcers (like employers) who would otherwise benefit
from illegal immigration and of sending a strong symbolic message about the
importance of immigration law enforcement.
Private enforcement, particularly its touted multiplier effect, has intuitive
appeal. But looking carefully at the twenty-one-year track record of federal
employer sanctions, we see that the benefits of the sanctions have been specula-
tive, at best, while the costs extracted through discrimination against those who
look or sound foreign are substantive and serious.' 2 These results raise impor-
tant doubts about the efficacy of private enforcement laws generally.
Enacted to reduce the "pull factor" of employment, federal employer sanc-
tions have not deterred illegal immigration. Although some indicators suggested
illegal immigration decreased shortly after the sanctions took place (for ex-
ample, decreased border apprehensions of undocumented immigrants), there
have also been important questions raised about the significance of those
indicators (for example, how much of the decreased border apprehensions
resulted from the concurrent legalization of 2.7 million undocumented immi-
grants).1 3 Moreover, many of those indicators returned to their pre-IRCA levels
within a few years, suggesting that any deterrence effect of employer sanctions
was temporary at best. What appears to have happened is that over time,
employers and employees found ways to comply with the letter of employer
sanctions laws (checking documents), without having to change the substance
of their business practices. That explanation is consistent with the burgeoning
10. See infra section H.B.2.
11. See infra section ll.B.4.
12. For more analysis about the benefits of private enforcement, see section Hl.B.
13. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVIcE (INS), 1994, at 32 tbl.4 (1996).
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availability of counterfeit documents. Together with the lack of enforcement,
these factors have made employer sanctions a largely toothless law. '
4
On the cost side, federal employer sanctions have been roundly criticized as
increasing discrimination against legal immigrants and citizens. In a 1990
congressionally mandated survey, the then-General Accounting Office (GAO)
concluded that ten percent of employers engaged in illegal national-origin
discrimination as a result of the sanctions (for example, not hiring workers who
look or sound foreign), constituting "a widespread pattern of discrimination. ' 5
The survey also found that an additional nine percent of employers engaged in
illegal citizenship discrimination (for example, hiring only workers born in the
United States) as a result of the sanctions. 16 Based on correlations in its data,
GAO concluded that at least some of the discrimination could be attributed to
employers' misunderstanding of or confusion about the law's requirements.
1 7
The track record of federal employer sanctions provides important lessons for
private enforcement laws generally. First, the failure of employer sanctions to
deter illegal immigration raises serious doubts about the ability of other private
enforcement laws to do so. Employer sanctions were implemented on a national
level, with extensive federal resources, and yet have been unable to deter illegal
immigration. With jobs still available to draw undocumented immigrants, it
seems unlikely that private enforcement laws in other areas like housing will
have much deterrent effect. Furthermore, the implementation problems that
have plagued employer sanctions (private enforcer confusion, fraudulent docu-
ments, and lack of government enforcement) may also undermine the effective-
ness of other private enforcement laws as well.
Second, our experience with employer sanctions shows us clearly the discrimi-
natory costs of putting immigration enforcement obligations into private hands.
Private parties, not trained in immigration law and not given clear legal
guidelines, are likely to make mistakes, resulting in accidental over-enforce-
ment (denying benefits to applicants with legal immigration status) and under-
enforcement of the immigration laws (granting benefits to applicants without
legal immigration status).
The legal complexities of immigration law also create great potential for intentional
discrimination. Those private parties intent on discrimination find the perfect pretext
in private enforcement laws. Using the laws as a shield, these private parties could
refuse to provide services to all immigrants, certain groups of immigrants, or those
who simply "look like" immigrants. Or more subtly, the private parties could demand
proof of legal status (or more proof) only from certain groups, making illegal
distinctions based on national origin, citizenship status, or race.
14. A detailed analysis of the effect of employer sanctions on illegal immigration can be found in
section II.B.l.a.
15. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNNG OFmCE, REPORT TO nm CONGRESS, IMmGRATON REPoRM: EMrioai SANCIONS
AND THE QUESnON OF DLSCRImATION 38-39 (1990) [hereinafter GAO 1990 DSatMNATION REPORT].
16. Id. at 39.
17. Id. at 61-63.
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The potential for error and discrimination is rooted in the complexities of
immigration law. With the many categories of immigrants and non-immigrants
authorized by U.S. immigration law, determining legal presence can be a
confusing task. There is no one definitive document that establishes legal
presence. For example, consider that while most visitors to the United States
have visas, many (like those from countries that participate in the visa waiver
program) do not. And then there are those who initially arrive without legal
status (like applicants for political asylum) but then, as allowed by U.S. law,
take steps to legalize their presence. These groups of individuals are authorized
to be in the United States (and authorized to rent housing, travel, and in some
cases, work), but to private parties who have no immigration law training,
making that determination can be fraught with error. And the consequences for
erroneous determinations are severe: for under-enforcement, private parties face
criminal and civil penalties while the nation's enforcement goals are not ad-
vanced; for over-enforcement, individuals who are legally present are denied
housing, transportation, and other necessities.
In Part I of this Article, I define private enforcement and explore the
expansion of private enforcement laws into different sectors, studying the
circumstances motivating the expansion. Private enforcement occurs when
private parties, acting under a requirement of law, check for legal immigration
status before granting applicants access to a restricted benefit. Effectively
beginning with federal employer sanctions in 1986, private enforcement has
spread into the housing and transportation areas, with proposals for expansion
into the medical, educational, and charitable areas.
In Part II, I examine the effectiveness of private enforcement laws, drawing
from the experience of federal employer sanctions. Finding that federal em-
ployer sanctions have not decreased illegal immigration or punished private
employers benefiting from illegal immigration, I suggest that the main benefit of
sanctions has been to establish that hiring undocumented workers is indeed
illegal. But weighed against the increased discrimination that sanctions have
created toward job applicants who look or sound foreign (discrimination attribut-
able, in large part, to employers' misunderstanding or confusion about the
sanctions' requirements), I conclude that employer sanctions have not been an
effective immigration law policy. Because other private enforcement laws
depend on a similar enforcement mechanism, I conclude that the benefits of
private enforcement laws are mostly symbolic, sending tough messages about
the importance of immigration law enforcement, while the costs in increased
discrimination are real and serious.
I. THE SCOPE OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
A. DEFINING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
What exactly is private enforcement? There are two components to consider:
determining who the private enforcers are and determining what the enforce-
[Vol. 96:777
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ment consists of. The "who" consists of private parties who are not government
employees but are nonetheless required to enforce immigration laws. Examples
of private enforcers include employers, landlords, and school administrators.
The "what" of private enforcement is usually limited to checking and confirm-
ing the legal immigration status of others who seek a restricted benefit (employ-
ment, housing, and so forth).
18
In defining the "who" of private enforcement, there are several compelling
reasons for drawing the line at government employment. First, intuitively,
someone enforcing immigration laws as part of her governmental duties cannot
be engaging in private enforcement. And though government enforcement of
immigration laws does generate controversy, 9 it is really the paradigm of
private enforcement that is new and novel.
Second, as a pragmatic matter, government employees are more likely than
their private sector counterparts to receive immigration law training, thus
potentially alleviating some of the policy concerns of private enforcement. 20 At
a minimum, it would be possible for governments to mandate that their employ-
ees receive immigration law training, something harder to achieve within the
decentralized private sector.
Finally, there is legal and political consistency in defining private enforce-
ment as non-government enforcement. Through private enforcement, the govern-
ment is shifting some of the responsibility of immigration law enforcement to
private parties, who are not trained to enforce (or compensated for doing so).
This Article focuses on the efficacy of the shifting, but the phenomenon of
private enforcement also raises similar legal and political questions: are govern-
ments also shifting political accountability for immigration law enforcement? If
a private party violates civil rights laws, who should be held responsible for
damages-the private party, the government requiring the private enforcement,
18. None of the private enforcement laws require enforcers to directly report undocumented immi-
grants to federal authorities. However, some of the locally passed employment sanctions and housing
laws require employers or landlords who are cited for violations to submit affidavits, identifying the
immigrant(s) by name and address, in order to avoid penalties. The affidavits, in some cases, are passed
on to federal immigration authorities. For more about private enforcement laws, see infra Part II.
19. See, e.g., Press Release, S. Poverty Law Ctr., SPLC Sues Immigration Agency: Lawsuit
Challenges Constitutionality of Raids in Georgia (Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.splcenter.org/legal/news/
article.jsp?aid=221&site -area= 1 (describing federal lawsuit filed against Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, alleging that agents harassed Latinos in workplace and home raids, solely based on their
appearance).
20. Border Patrol agents, for example, go through a rigorous nineteen-week training program in
which they take courses in immigration and nationality law, among other subjects. Frequently Asked
Questions About Working for the CBP Border Patrol (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/
careers/customscareers/border._careers /bp.agent/faqs..working-forthe usbp.xml. Even local govern-
ment authorities, not normally charged with immigration enforcement responsibilities, may receive
immigration training upon accepting those responsibilities. For example, Alabama has entered into a
training agreement with Immigration and Customs Enforcement to train its state troopers to enforce
immigration laws, and as of 2006, sixty troopers had received this training. Press Release, U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Alabama Troopers Complete Federal Immigration Training
(Sept. 1, 2006), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/06090ldc.htm.
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both or none? Finally, should private parties be compensated in some way for
their new enforcement responsibilities?
The "what" of private enforcement focuses on the checking of legal status by
private parties before restricted benefits are distributed or sold. The laws at issue
here do not require private parties to do anything beyond checking legal status
and then denying the restricted benefit if legal status cannot be proven. Do these
duties qualify as immigration law enforcement?
The answer is yes, on several different levels. If, as a matter of plain meaning, "to
enforce" is to "give force to,"'2 ' "cause to take effect,"22 or "compel obedience to,' '23
then private parties are "enforcing" the nation's immigration laws. By making it
more difficult for undocumented immigrants to travel, obtain housing, educa-
tion or health care, private parties are "compel[ing] obedience to" two basic
immigration laws: Immigration and Nationality Act Sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i)
(illegal to enter the United States without authorization) 24 and 237(a)(1)(B)
(illegal to remain in the United States without authorization). 25 Private enforce-
ment laws, advocates would argue, enforce our immigration laws by encourag-
ing undocumented immigrants to leave or discouraging their immigration in the
first place.
Some might object that this enforcement is indirect, at best, and more akin to
execution of government policy, than actual enforcement. And certainly, the
private enforcement at issue here falls short of traditional immigration enforce-
ment done by government authorities: investigation and reporting of immigra-
tion status; and often for those without lawful status, arrest, removal hearing,
and actual removal. But this objection is only relevant if we are focused on the
government's authority to act upon private citizens and any resulting liability.
26
In this Article, however, the focus is on the efficacy of private enforcement, so
addressing these legal questions is not essential to our inquiry.27
21. THE AMERCAN HERI AGE DICTIONARY OF Tm ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2004), available at
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/enforce (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
22. MERiu.-VtansER's DICrIONARY OF LAW (1996), available at http://dictionary.reference.conV
browse/enforce (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
23. DICrmoNARY.cOm UNABRIDGED, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/enforce (last visited Oct.
17, 2007).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2000).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
26. For example, could the government require private citizens to report undocumented immigrants
to government authorities, similar perhaps to the mandatory reporting system required in the child
protection context? And if so, at what point would private citizens become government actors for the
purpose of finding government liability? For more on the question of private party liability in the civil
rights context, see Myriam Gilles, Private Parties as Defendants in Civil Rights Litigation, 26 CARnozo
L. REv. 1 (2004).
27. Enforcement has been defined broadly in other contexts as well. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 185 (2000) (defining citizen
monitoring of environmental violations as enforcement of environmental laws); see also Nuno Garoupa
& Fernando Gomez-Pomar, Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions
in Addition to Regulatory Penalties, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 410 (2004) (using economic analysis to
argue for the combined use of criminal sanctions and regulatory penalties to enforce laws).
[Vol. 96:777
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It is also worth noting that the governments that pass private enforcement
laws see their efforts as enforcing immigration laws. In passing federal em-
ployer sanctions, Congress made clear its intent that employer sanctions be an
essential part of immigration law enforcement.28 At the local governmental
level, private enforcement laws are often passed to fill perceived holes in the
federal government's enforcement efforts. For example, in passing its own
employer sanctions system, Suffolk County, New York explained that
since there has been a lack of enforcement of a twenty (20) year old federal
law (Simpson-Mazzoli) that requires businesses to verify that their employees
are legally eligible to be employed in the United States, Suffolk County has
an opportunity to lead by example in an effort to prod the federal government
to undertake such enforcement action.29
B. THE EXPANDING REACH OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
Private enforcement of immigration laws is a recent phenomenon, effectively
starting with the federal employer sanctions laws passed in 1986. To be sure,
there have been instances of private parties volunteering to enforce immigration
laws, but private enforcement mandated by law, for the most part, is of recent
vintage. 30 This section examines the expansion of private enforcement laws into
different fields.
As an initial matter, we should remember that the lion's share of immigration
enforcement is still done by government employees, mostly at the federal level
but also increasingly at the local levels. At the federal level, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), both
within the Department of Homeland Security, have the primary responsibility
for enforcing the nation's immigration laws. CBP is responsible for "protecting
28. See Alan K. Simpson, U.S. Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and Antidiscrimination
Provisions, 9 U. ARK. LrrrL RocK L. REv. 563, 563-64 (1986-87) ("The maximum effort in Congress
to control illegal immigration to the United States has been expended over the last fifteen years ....
[T]here is a common feature to every bill that has been seriously considered: inclusion of 'employer
sanctions' as the main enforcement mechanism.").
29. Suffolk County, N.Y., Local Law No. 52-2006 (Aug. 8, 2006).
30. A recent example of voluntary private enforcement is the Minutemen Project, a self-described
"citizens' Vigilance Operation monitoring immigration, business, and government." See Boyles, Gil-
christ Cited Dubious Stats on Illegal Immigration, COLO. MEDIA MATTERs, Aug. 3, 2006, http://
colorado.mediamatters.org/items/200608040001. This language used to appear on the Minutemen
Project's website, but has since been removed. See Welcome to the Minutemen Project, http://
www.minutemanproject.com/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2007). Denounced by President Bush as "vigilante"
activity, the Minutemen have set up patrols at the southern border to monitor and report the crossing of
undocumented immigrants. Amy Argetsinger, In Ariz., "Minutemen" Start Border Patrols; Volunteers
Crusade To Stop Illegal Crossings, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2005, at A03.
An exception to the recent trend is the longstanding obligation that carriers have had to ensure that
their passengers are fit for entry to the U.S., with valid visas or other authorization to enter. See Marvin
H. Morse & Lucy M. Moran, Troubling the Waters: Human Cargos, 33 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 11-12
(2002) (describing carrier liability under federal and state laws for immigration ineligibility of
passengers as "nothing new").
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the sovereign borders of the United States, at and between the official ports of
entry,"3 ' Though this mission encompasses more than just immigration enforce-
ment,32 a substantial portion of its resources are spent enforcing immigration
laws. In fiscal year 2006, for example, CBP processed 422.9 million people
seeking admission to the United States and apprehended over 1.3 million people
trying to enter illegally. 33 ICE is responsible for immigration law enforcement
in the interior of the country. 34 Also in fiscal year 2006, ICE removed 185,431
undocumented immigrants from the country35 and seized more than $42 million
in assets through immigration-related investigations.36
State and local governments are getting involved in immigration law enforce-
ment too, with encouragement from the federal government. In 2002, reversing
its previous legal position, the Department, of Justice invited local and state
police to enforce both civil and criminal immigration laws, opining that state
governments have "inherent authority" to do SO. 3 7 Taking up that invitation,
local law enforcement in Florida, Alabama, and Los Angeles County have
entered into training agreements with ICE and currently have immigration law
enforcement responsibilities. Other local jurisdictions have pending agree-
38ments.
Proportionally, private enforcement is still a small percentage of total immigra-
tion enforcement. And it should be noted that some of the private enforcement
laws, particularly those enacted by local governments, have not been imple-
mented because of legal challenges.39 Still, even as specific laws face legal
31. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION BUDGET iN BRIEF
(2007), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact-sheets/budget/.
32. CBP is also responsible for preventing the cross border smuggling of contraband such as
controlled substances, weapons, and prohibited plants and animals. Id.
33. 2006: A Year of Accomplishment, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/full-text-articles/
accompyr06.xml (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).
34. ICE's self-described mission is to "protect America and uphold public safety by targeting the
people, money and materials that support terrorist and criminal activities." U.S. IMMIGRATION &
CUSTOMS EN-oRcEMENT, ICE FIsCAL YEAR 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2007), available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/about/ICE-06AR.pdf. Besides its immigration functions, ICE investigates and prosecutes crimi-
nal organizations involved with counterfeit products, investigates and prosecutes pedophiles and other
predatory criminals, and provides security services to federal buildings. Id. at 2-3.
35. Id. at v.
36. Id. at 4.
37. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks on the National Security Entry-Exit
Registration System (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/
060502agpreparedremarks.htm.
38. Susan Ferriss, When Cops Probe Immigrants, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 27, 2006, at Al. For more
on the debate about local law enforcement of immigration laws, see Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessen-
tial Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police To Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALa. L.
REv. 179 (2005); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not To Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and
the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CN. L. REv. 1373 (2006); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in
the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the
Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 965 (2004).
39. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Tex.
2007) (granting a preliminary injunction against the city's ordinance that would have required landlords
[Vol. 96:777
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challenge, the concept of private enforcement continues to expand, as described
below.
1. Employment
The employment field has seen the most private enforcement activity. The
driving rationale of these laws is to make it more difficult for undocumented
immigrants to find work in the United States and thus reduce the main "pull
factor" that draws them here. By threatening employers with lost contracts and
licenses, fines, and even prison sentences, these laws, in effect, require employ-
ers to check and vouch for the authorized status of their employees. The laws
are designed to encourage all employers to abide by immigration laws and to
increase the costs for those inclined to hire unauthorized workers.
There are two broad categories of employment-related private enforcement
laws: (1) general employer sanctions that require employers to check the
immigration status of all employees or face civil and criminal penalties, and (2)
more targeted sanctions that require businesses to verify employees' immigra-
tion status as a condition of obtaining business licenses, government contracts,
economic grants, or tax deductions.
In the employment field, local governments and the federal government have
both passed private enforcement laws, with states taking the first step. In 1971,
fifteen years before IRCA, California passed a law that prohibited employers
from knowingly hiring unauthorized workers and threatened them with civil
fines of $200 to $1000 for violations. 4° Ten states and one city soon followed
suit, passing similar legislation.41 In at least eight of these states, however, few
cases were ever prosecuted under the laws, largely because employer sanctions
cases were considered a low law enforcement priority.
42
With the passage of IRCA in 1986, the federal government took the lead.
IRCA took a three-pronged approach to illegal immigration: legalization for
many undocumented immigrants already here (long-term residents and agricul-
tural workers), enhanced border security to prevent future illegal crossings, and
employer sanctions to dry up the pull factor of higher-paying jobs. Employer
sanctions were the centerpiece of the legislation as Congress believed that
to check tenants' immigration status because the ordinance was preempted by federal law and was void
for vagueness); Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 06-CC-3802 (Cir. Ct. St. Louis County Mar. 12,
2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/inmigrants/valleypark-opinion.pdf (holding that the city's
ordinances penalizing businesses which hire undocumented workers and landlords who rent to undocu-
mented tenants are invalid because they violate state law).
40. Carl E. Schwarz, Employer Sanctions Laws, Worker Identification Systems, and Undocumented
Aliens: The State Experience and Federal Proposals, 19 STAN. J. Ihr'L L. 371, 402 (1983). The
constitutionality of the California statute was upheld in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355, 365 (1976)
(holding California's statute was not unconstitutional as an immigration regulation and was not
preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act).
41. Those local governments were Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Montana, New Hampshire, Vermont, Virginia, and the city of Las Vegas, Nevada. Schwarz, supra note
40, at 373.
42. Id. at 383.
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illegal immigration was driven by employment opportunities:
This legislation seeks to close the back door on illegal immigration so that the
front door on legal immigration may remain open. The principal means of
closing the back door, or curtailing future illegal immigration, is through
employer sanctions .... Employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here
illegally.... Employers will be deterred by the penalties in this legislation
from hiring unauthorized aliens, and this, in turn, will deter aliens from
entering illegally or violating their status in search of employment.
4 3
The federal employer sanctions are general sanctions, applying to all employ-
ers with few exceptions." The sanctions impose two requirements on employ-
ers: one substantive (prohibiting the "knowing" hire of a person unauthorized to
work in the United States)45 and one administrative (requiring all employers to
verify the employment eligibility of all employees by checking for certain
documents). 46
The two requirements interact in a significant way. Compliance with the
administrative requirements provides employers with a shield against charges of
substantive violations. Section 274A(a)(3) allows an employer who can demon-
strate good faith compliance with the administrative requirements to assert an
affirmative defense to any substantive violations.47 Under that provision, an
employer charged with substantive violations can point to its attempts to
comply with the document verification requirements to establish a rebuttable
affirmative defense a.4 Critics charge that this affirmative defense makes prosecu-
tion of substantive offenses very difficult.
49
An employer knowingly employs an unauthorized worker in violation of the
statute when she has actual knowledge of the employee's unauthorized status or
when she has reason to know. Federal regulations define "knowing" as includ-
ing "not only actual knowledge but also knowledge which may fairly be
inferred through notice of certain facts and circumstances which would lead a
person, through the exercise of reasonable care, to know about a certain
condition."5 Furthermore, according to federal regulations, an employer's knowl-
43. H. REP. No. 99-682(1), at 46 (1986).
44. Because of a grandfathering provision, the sanctions do not apply to employees hired, recruited,
or referred before November 7, 1986. 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.7(a) (2007).
45. INA § 274A(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1324A(a)(1)(A) (2000).
46. INA § 274A(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1324A(a)(1)(B) (2000).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1324A(a)(3) (2007).
48. 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.4, 1274a.4 (2007). Section 274A(b)(6) does not even require successful
compliance, but rather counts a good faith verification attempt as compliance "notwithstanding a
technical or procedural failure to meet such requirement if there was a good faith effort to comply." An
example of a technical or procedural failure that has been excused is the failure to include a date on
section 2 of the 1-9 form (where the employer attests that she has reviewed the required forms and that
they appear genuine). WSC Plumbing, Inc., 9 O.C.A.H.O. no. 1061 (Dep't of Justice, 2000).
49. For more critique of the federal employer sanctions, see section II.B.
50. 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.1(1)(1), 1274a.1(1)(1) (2007).
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edge can be inferred where the employer fails to complete or improperly
completes the 1-9 form.5' But this broad definition of knowledge has been
questioned.5 2 At least one court has suggested that knowing requires something
more akin to willful blindness. In Collins Foods International, Inc. v. Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Service, the Ninth Circuit held that an employer does not
have constructive knowledge of its employee's unauthorized status simply
because the employer had not compared the back of the fraudulent Social
Security card to the sample card in the INS manual.5 3
If ICE can prove a substantive violation, the employer is subject to civil fines
of $250 to $2000 per unauthorized employee hired.5 4 For subsequent substan-
tive offenses, the employer may be fined $2000 to $10,000 for each unautho-
rized hire. 5 If ICE proves an administrative violation, the employer is subject
to fines of $100 to $1000 for each employee with inadequate paperwork.
56
Criminal penalties also may be imposed on an employer who "engages in a
pattern or practice" of substantive violations.57
The federal employer sanctions expressly preempt all local employer sanc-
tions laws, with a limited exception for licensing and other similar laws.5 Thus,
all of the general employer sanctions laws that were passed by states before
IRCA were preempted. Despite this preemption provision, at least one state,
Colorado, passed a general employer sanctions law after IRCA. In 2006, along
with other get-tough immigration legislation,59 Colorado passed H.B. 1017,
which requires Colorado employers to verify the legal work status of all new
employees and if requested, to submit documentation of employees' legal status
to the state Department of Labor and Employment. 6° Employers who, with
reckless disregard, fail to submit the requested documents or submit false
documents are subject to a maximum $5000 fine for first offenses and $25,000
51. 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.1(1)(1)(i), 1274a.1(1)(1)(i) (2007). The 1-9 is the immigration form that requires
an employer to attest that the employee has produced documents establishing identity and employment
authorization and that the documents appear reasonably genuine. 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.l(g), 1274a.l(g),
274a.2(b)(1)(iv), 1274a.2(b)(l)(iv) (2007).
52. See, e.g., Walden Station, Inc., 8 O.C.A.H.O. 1053 (2000) (incomplete or inaccurate 1-9 form is
not enough to establish employer's knowledge of employee's unauthorized status).
53. 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991).
54. INA § 274A(e)(4)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(i) (2000).
55. INA § 274A(e)(4)(A)(ii)-(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2000).
56. INA § 274A(e)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5) (2000).
57. The maximum criminal penalties are $3000 fines per unauthorized hire, six month imprison-
ment, or both. INA § 274A(f)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1) (2000).
58. "The provisions of this section [employer sanctions] preempt any State or local law imposing
civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or
recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens." INA § 274A(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)
(2000).
59. Mark P. Couch & Chris Frates, Immigration Pact OK'd Strongest Reform in U.S., DENVER POST,
July 11, 2006, at A01.
60. H.B. 1017, 2006 Leg. Sess., 1st Spec. Sess. (Co. 2006), codified at CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-2-122(2)-
(3) (2006).
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maximum fines for subsequent offenses. 6t Legal status is defined by reference
to federal law.62
By contrast, most local private enforcement laws threaten employers with
more targeted penalties-the loss of government benefits like a business license,
a government contract or grant, or a tax deduction. The approach taken by
Hazleton, Pennsylvania is typical. Entitled the Illegal Immigration Relief Act
Ordinance (IIRA), Hazleton's law required landlords and employers to verify
the legal immigration status of their tenants and employees or risk fines or other
city-imposed penalties. 63 Though it has been declared unconstitutional 64 the
ordinance is worth studying, because it has become a model for other towns and
cities seeking to pass local immigration legislation.65
Like many targeted employer sanction laws, Hazleton's ordinance requires
businesses applying for a business license to attest that they do not knowingly.
hire unauthorized workers. Unauthorized-worker status is defined by reference
to federal law. If the city receives a valid complaint that a particular business
hires unauthorized workers, the city will suspend the business license if the
business does not fire the unauthorized workers within three business days of
receiving notice from the city.66 Perhaps most controversially, in provisions not
often copied by other local governments, a Hazleton business seeking to
reinstate its license must submit an affidavit that includes the "name, address
and other adequate identifying information of the unlawful workers related to
the complaint. ' '67 For subsequent violations, the city will forward the affidavit,
complaint and other related documents to federal authorities.68
61. Id. at § 8-2-122(4).
62. Id. at § 8-2-122(1)(d).
63. HAmrN, PA., ORD NANCES 2006-18 (2006).
64. In July 2007, a federal judge ruled that Hazleton's lIRA ordinance, as well as its Tenant Registration
Ordinance (requiring apartment dwellers to prove legal immigration status to obtain an occupancy permit),
were unconstitutional on preemption and due process grounds. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F Supp. 2d 477
(M.D. Pa. 2007). The city has vowed to appeal the decision. See Darryl Fears, Judge Blocks City's Ordinances
Against Illegal Immigration, WAsH. Posr, July 27, 2007, at A2; David G. Savage & Nicole Gaouette, Hazleton
Immigration Law Is Rejected, L.A. Ths, July 27, 2007 at A20.
65. According to the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF), at least twenty-
nine local governments have passed laws requiring employers to verify the legal immigration status of
employees, with twenty-seven local governments considering or tabling similar legislation. PRLDEF
Latino Justice Campaign, http://www.prldef.org/Civil/Latino%20Justice%20Campaign.htm (last visited
Jan. 6, 2008); see also Abby Goodnough, A Florida Mayor Turns to an Immigration Curb To Fix a
Fading City, N.Y. TuMEs, July 10, 2006, at All (describing how Avon Park, Florida, modeled its
ordinance after Hazleton's).
66. HAZ ON, PA., OINuANcEs 2006-18 (2006). If the employer seeks to verify the employee's
status through the Basic Pilot program, then the three days is tolled while that verification is conducted.
Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-40 (2006). IRA was subsequently amended by Ordinance 2007-6, but
none of those minor amendments is relevant here. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 485. For more on the
Basic Pilot program, see note 70 infra.
67. HAZLErON, PA., OR IANcEs 2006-18 (2006).
68. Another unique Hazleton provision creates a private cause of action for authorized employees
who are fired if, at the time of the firing, the employer hired unauthorized workers and did not
participate in the Basic Pilot program. See id.
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Georgia, in broad sweeping immigration legislation passed in 2006,69 goes a
few steps further. Besides requiring employers with state contracts to use the
federal Basic Pilot program to verify the eligibility of new employees,7" Geor-
gia also requires employers to withhold 6% of paid compensation as state
income tax for employees who do not provide a taxpayer identification number
or who provide a tax identification number issued for nonresident aliens. An
employer who does not make the required withholding becomes responsible for
the taxes required. Also under Georgia law, employers are prohibited from
deducting as a business expense more than $600 paid in wages to unauthorized
employees.71 While not expressly requiring private enforcement, these Georgia
provisions make employing unauthorized workers even more costly.
2. Housing
The housing field has seen a tremendous amount of private enforcement
activity, second only to the employment field. Why are housing-related private
enforcement laws passed? The relationship between housing and illegal immigra-
tion is more nuanced than the relationship between employment and illegal
immigration. No one argues that the availability of housing is a pull factor,
drawing undocumented immigrants to the United States. Rather, advocates of
these laws (especially at the local level) seem to suggest that by making life in
the United States more difficult, undocumented immigrants already here have
more incentive to leave, and immigrants outside the country are discouraged
from entering or staying illegally. In pushing Avon Park, Florida to adopt a
housing private enforcement law, Mayor Tom Macklin urged, "If we address the
housing issue-make it as difficult as possible for illegals to find safe haven in
Avon Park-then they are going to have to find someplace else to go."
72
Federal law has long threatened with criminal penalties anyone who "know-
ing or in reckless disregard" of an immigrant's undocumented status "conceals,
69. Aside from employer sanctions, the legislation also requires state and local governments to
verify that applicants for government benefits are lawfully in the United States; authorizes state law
enforcement officials to enforce immigration laws; creates the offenses of human trafficking and
contributing to human trafficking; requires jail personnel to check the immigration status of those
charged with DUI or a felony and to contact ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) if the
defendant is not legally present; and limits the services that for-profit immigration assistance agencies
(not lawyers) can provide. See Georgia Security/Immigration Compliance Act, S.B. 529, 148th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006).
70. Basic Pilot, now known as E-Verify, is the voluntary federal program that enables employers to
verify the eligibility of new employees by checking the databases of the Social Security Administration
and the Department of Homeland Security. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Employment
Eligibility Verification, https://www.vis-dhs.com/EmployerRegistration/StartPage.aspx?JS =YES (last
visited Sept. 21, 2007). The requirement to use Basic Pilot is phased in-with employers with 500 or
more employees required to comply by July 1, 2007, employers with 100 to 500 employees by July 1,
2008, and employers with fewer than 100 employees by July 1, 2009. Ga. S.B. 529.
71. Ga. S.B. 529.
72. Goodnough, supra note 65. Avon Park eventually rejected the immigration ordinances. Casey
Woods, Immigration Opens Big Split in Small Town, MItAM HERALD, Aug. 9, 2006, at IA.
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harbors, or shields [the immigrant] from detection., 73 This prohibition expressly
includes harboring in "any building or any means of transportation. 74 Penalties
include a fine, a prison sentence up to five years, or both.7 5
Would a landlord who merely rents to an undocumented immigrant in a
commercial transaction, knowing or in reckless disregard of her illegal status,
violate this statute? The answer depends on what it means to "harbor," and the
courts are split on this issue. Most of the circuits define "harbor" broadly to
mean simply "afford shelter to," without requiring that the defendant actually
prevented or attempted to prevent detection by law enforcement agents.76 But at
least one circuit has held that to "harbor" means to "clandestinely shelter,
succor, and protect improperly admitted aliens."77 It is also significant to note
that even in the cases where the courts defined harboring broadly, the defen-
dants had more connections with the undocumented immigrants than simply
providing housing.78
By contrast, the local housing-related laws (all passed by cities and counties,
rather than by states) unambiguously define harboring to penalize landlords and
other owners who allow undocumented immigrants to occupy their dwelling
units. For example, the harboring definition passed by Cherokee County, Geor-
gia instructs owners that they may not "let, lease, or rent" or "suffer or permit
the occupancy" of a dwelling unit by an undocumented immigrant, "knowing or
in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in
the United States in violation of the law."' 79 Other local laws require a higher
mens rea of acting knowingly.80
73. INA § 274(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2000).
74. INA § 274(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2000) provides: "Any person who
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United
States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or
shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any building or any means of transportation" is
subject to criminal punishment.
75. INA § 274(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B) (2000). The prison sentence can be increased up
to ten years if "the offense was done for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial
gain;" up to twenty years if the defendant "causes serious bodily injury... or places in jeopardy the life
of another;" and can include a life sentence or the death penalty if the violation results in the death of
another. Id.
76. United States v. Acosta De Evans, 531 F.2d 428, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1976) (interpreting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(3), the predecessor to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)); see also United States v. Lopez, 521
F.2d 437, 440-41 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that harboring includes "conduct tending substantially to
facilitate an alien's remaining illegally in the U.S." (internal quotations omitted)).
77. Susnjar v. United States, 27 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1928), followed by United States v.
Belevin-Ramales, 458 F. Supp. 2d 409 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (holding that the government had to prove that
the defendant acted with intent to prevent detection of the undocumented immigrant).
78. See, e.g., Lopez, 521 F.2d at 439 (undocumented immigrants entered the country knowing the
addresses of the defendant's houses; they traveled directly to his houses; he helped them obtain work
and transportation to work, and arranged fraudulent marriages for them to claim legal residence);
Acosta De Evans, 531 F.2d at 428 (defendant was related to the undocumented immigrant and had
previously met her in Mexico, where they talked about the difficulty of obtaining immigration papers).
79. CHEROKEE CouNTY, GA., ORDiNANcEs no. 2006-003 (2006).
80. See, e.g., WEST HAZLMoN, PA., OR~iNAwcas 2006-3 (2006).
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These local laws tend to use a similar system for meting out penalties.
Landlords and others who "harbor" undocumented immigrants face fines from
$5081 to $1000,82 which are levied for every day that the landowner is found to
be in violation (and sometimes for every undocumented adult immigrant found
living in the unit).83 Many of the laws also suspend the business license for the
dwelling unit, preventing the landlord from collecting rent on that unit.84
Unlike many of the employer sanctions, the housing laws do not impose on
landlords any separate administrative requirement to verify the lawful im-
migration status of tenants. However, particularly in jurisdictions which impose
liability for reckless disregard, as well as for knowledge, the incentive is high
for landlords to affirmatively check their tenants' immigration status. For
example, after Valley Park, Missouri passed its housing law, landlord James
Zhang sent his apartment manager door-to-door, telling residents that if they
were not in the United States legally, they needed to move out. Within a week,
twenty of his forty-eight units were empty, with some families leaving so
quickly that they did not even take their furniture with them.85
How does a landlord or other property owner determine who is lawfully
present, so as to avoid harboring violations? This is a central weakness of the
housing-related laws. Unlike employers, landlords subject to these ordinances
are not given a list of documents to check to determine if tenants or potential
tenants are lawfully present. In fact, some of the local laws are painfully silent
on this issue, incorporating by reference federal immigration law defining legal
presence and leaving it to the landlords to figure OUt. 86 Other local laws, like
that passed in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, have outlined procedures for verifying a
tenant's immigration status with the federal government, either at the request of
the landlord or after the city receives a complaint about a particular landlord and
starts an investigation.
3. Transportation
In the transportation context, the private enforcement law of main con-
cern is Section 274(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the INA, which imposes criminal punish-
ment on:
81. See, e.g., NASHVILLE, TN., ORDINANCES no. BL2006-1234 (tabled as of Nov. 21, 2006).
82. See, e.g., WEST HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCES 2006-3 (Aug. 10, 2006).
83. See, e.g., EsCoNDiDo, CA., ORDIArNCES no. 2006-38. On December 13, 2006, the City Council of
Escondido agreed to a permanent injunction, barring enforcement of the ordinance. Statement Regard-
ing City of Escondido Actions Stipulation for Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, available at
http://www.ci.escondido.ca.us/immigration/Statement.pdf (Dec. 13, 2006).
84. See, e.g., CHEROKEE CouNtry, GA., ORDINANCES no. 2006-003 (Dec. 5, 2006).
85. Stephen Deere, Driven by Immigration Law, Families Flee Valley Park, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 14, 2006, at Al. Zhang noted that the minimum $500 fine threatened under the housing
law was more than the monthly $450 rent he collected on each unit. Id.
86. See, e.g., VALLEY PARK, MO., ORDINANCES 1708 (July 17, 2006); WEST HAZLETON, PA., ORDI-
NANCES 2006-3 (Aug. 10, 2006).
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[a]ny person who knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has
come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of such law,
transports, or moves or attempts to transport or move such alien within the
United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such
violation of law.
87
There are federal laws that impose private enforcement duties at the border or
upon entrance to the country, but they are not the focus of our analysis.88 From
a private enforcement perspective, duties imposed at the border are less con-
troversial. By transporting others across the border, the carriers and private
persons who are subject to these laws presumably know they have immigration-
compliance obligations and, thus, can and should be held responsible for un-
derstanding the laws' requirements. With more legal understanding, the poten-
tial for discrimination-unintentional or otherwise-is diminished.
By contrast, those transporting in the. interior of the country are less likely to
have the necessary training to make immigration distinctions, thus raising more
private enforcement concerns. To face criminal liability under § 274(a)(1)(A)(ii),
a defendant does not have to have actual knowledge that the person being
transported is unlawfully present; reckless disregard of that status is enough.
And unlawful presence includes both people who enter illegally and those who
enter legally but violate the terms of their stay (typically by overstaying the
length of their permitted visit). The lower mens rea requirement substantially broad-
ens the scope of liability, though that broadening is tempered by the requirement that
the transportation be "in furtherance" of the immigration violation.89
Criminal penalties for violation include a fine, up to five years' imprisonment,
or both. If the offense is committed for commercial advantage or private
financial gain, the possible prison sentence increases to ten years. If a defendant
causes serious bodily injury or jeopardizes another's life, he could be sentenced
up to twenty years; if he causes death, he faces a possible life sentence. 90
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
88. For example, civil laws require everyone bringing noncitizens into the United States to make
sure that the noncitizens only land at authorized ports of entry. INA § 271(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a)
(2000). Carriers, in particular, must ensure that non-citizen passengers have unexpired visas (if a visa is
required); carriers also face penalties if. they fail to remove stowaways. INA § 273, 8 U.S.C. § 1323
(2000). Carriers and private persons face criminal penalties if, knowing that an individual is a
non-citizen, they try to bring her into the country in a manner or place not authorized by the federal
government. INA § 274(a)(l)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A)(i) (2000). For more on the history of
carrier liability for the immigration status of their passengers, see Morse & Moran, supra note 30.
For present purposes, federal and state human trafficking statutes are also excluded because they require
more than the knowing transportation of undocumented immigrants. Georgia, for example, states that a person
commits trafficking for labor servitude when he or she "knowingly subjects or maintains another in labor
servitude or knowingly recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means another person
for the purpose of labor servitude." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-46 (West 2006).
89. "Any person who knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered,
or remains in the United States in violation of the law, transports... such alien within the United States
... in furtherance of such violation of law." 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2000) (emphasis added).
90. INA §§ 274a(l)(B)(i)-(iv), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(l)(B)(i)-(iv) (2000).
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What are the implications for private enforcement? Section 274(a)(1)(A)(ii)
does not impose an affirmative requirement on those providing interior transpor-
tation to check the immigration status of potential passengers. And many of the
cases prosecuted under this provision involve defendants who actually knew the
undocumented status of their passengers. 9 ' Still, the "reckless disregard" lan-
guage might give a cautious transporter incentive to check immigration status.
In the transportation context, reckless disregard is defined as "deliberate indiffer-
ence to facts which, if considered and weighed in a reasonable manner, indicate
the highest probability that the alleged aliens were in fact aliens and were in the
United States unlawfully.
92
The prosecution under this provision that has had the most private enforce-
ment effect was the 2001 indictment of Golden State Transportation, a Los
Angeles-based bus company. According to the federal indictment, Golden State
conspired with smugglers to transport hundreds of undocumented immigrants from
the United States-Mexico border to cities in the interior. Golden State allowed
smugglers to buy large blocks of tickets in advance; to thwart immigration law
enforcement, the company scheduled its arrivals and departures late at night and
changed established routes to avoid Border Patrol checkpoints. 93 Golden State even-
tually pled guilty to charges of smuggling under §274(a)(1)(A)(ii), conspiracy to
smuggle, and money laundering. The company forfeited a terminal worth $2.5
million, as well as over $100,000 in cash seized during the investigation. Its owners
and managers also pled guilty to various harboring and transporting charges94
The reaction among bus companies to Golden State's conviction has impor-
tant private enforcement implications. In 2002, shortly after Golden State was
indicted, Greyhound began warning its employees not to sell tickets "to anyone you
know or believe to be an illegal alien"; a violation could lead to the employee's
tennination, arrest, or both. Asking "How do you recognize groups of illegal aliens?"
Greyhound's guidelines instructed employees to look for large groups traveling
together, with little or no luggage, led by one person (likely the smuggler), and
moving in single file. The guidelines also advised employees to look out for smug-
glers, who often use the Spanish word "pollito" (a form of pollo or chicken) to
describe their clients. Sistema Internacional de Transporte de Autobuses Inc., a
Greyhound subsidiary, also adopted a similar employee-training policy.
95
91. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez-Palacios, 30 F.3d 1290, 1294 (10th Cir. 1994) (defendant
admitted that he knew his passengers were in the U.S. illegally); United States v. Hernandez-Guardado,
228 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2000) (defendant admitted that there was "substantial evidence" that he
knew his passengers were illegally present).
92. United States v. Uresti-Hernandez, 968 F.2d 1042, 1046 (10th Cir. 1992).
93. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Regional Bus Company Charged in Historic Migrant Smuggling
Case (Dec. 10, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/December/01-ag-636.htm.
94. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Bus Company Owners & Managers Plead Guilty and Are
Sentenced in Illegal Alien Smuggling & Employment Case (May 19, 2006), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/usao/pressreleases/2006/2006-078(GoldenState).pdf.
95. Berestein & de la Vega, Bus Company Policy Irks Latino Groups, SAN DIEGo UNI N-Thm., Sept.
23, 2005, at Al.
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After receiving complaints from the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund (MALDEF) and the National Council of La Raza, 96 Grey-
hound modified its guidelines. Now called "Implementing Prohibitions on
Smuggling of Undocumented Persons and Racial Profiling," the company re-
moved all references to Spanish words and gave equal space to explaining the
company's prohibition against racial profiling.97
The Golden State prosecution and its aftermath identify some of the problems
with private enforcement in the transportation sector. Briefly stated here, carri-
ers are understandably nervous about their liability, particularly when reckless
disregard is enough to impose criminal penalties. But implementing employee
training and other policies to avoid criminal liability is a difficult task, particu-
larly with concerns about discrimination and racial profiling.98
4. Future Areas for Private Enforcement
Currently, private enforcement laws exist only in the employment, housing,
and transportation fields. But, proposed legislation and other signals suggest
legislative interest in expanding the reach of private enforcement into education,
medical care, and even charity services. This section explores the possible
expansion of private enforcement laws.
a. Education. In education, there are laws that deny government educational
benefits to undocumented students, but there are currently no laws that require
private parties to play the enforcement role. 99 To date, there are no laws that
restrict the ability of private colleges to enroll or give private financial aid to
undocumented students; similarly, there are no laws that prohibit undocumented
students from attending public colleges, if they can find private sources of
funding.too
96. Said John Trasvina, now MALDEF's president and general counsel, "There are elements in [the
guidelines] which make it very clear they are talking about Latinos. The policy really screams of racial
profiling and discrimination from start to end." Id.
97. On racial profiling, the new guidelines state: "In the transportation industry, profiling may
involve classifying a passenger or potential passenger as 'illegal' based on assumptions about the
individual's race, color, ethnicity, national original [sic] or other personal characteristics rather than
based on the individual's actual activities or conduct. Company personnel shall not engage in such
profiling." GREYHOUND LINES, INC., IMPLEMENTING PROHIBITIONS ON SMUGGLING OF UNDOCUMENTED PER-
SONS AND RACIAL PROFILNG (revised Jan. 10, 2006) (on file with author).
98. For more analysis of the private enforcement concerns, see infra Part II.
99. For example, federal student aid programs (including Pell Grants and federally subsidized loans)
are only available to citizens and legal permanent residents. To apply for this aid, students complete a
federal application (FAFSA-Free Application for Federal Student Aid), in which they verify their
eligible immigration status by providing a Social Security number and, if applicable, an alien regis-
tration number. Schools use the FAFSA information to prepare a financial aid package which may
include federal aid, but the initial eligibility determination is made by the federal government. See
generally FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC., COMPLETING TmE 2007-08 FAFSA 4 & 6, available at
http://studentaid.ed.gov/students/attachments/siteresources/CompletingtheFAFSAO7-08.pdf.
100. In 2006, the Missouri legislature considered House Bill 1864, which would have prohibited
undocumented students from attending any public Missouri college or university, even if they had
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Why no private enforcement laws in the education field? There are two
explanations, one legal and one pragmatic. On the legal side, in the 1982 Plyler
v. Doe case, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law that denied undocu-
mented children the opportunity to receive a free public education.1 'O Holding
that undocumented immigrants are entitled to equal protection of the law, the
Court found that Texas-and states generally-have no substantial interest in
denying a basic education to undocumented children.10 2 Plyler v. Doe ties local
governments' hands on the issue of public secondary education and, by analogy,
on private secondary education as well.
On the pragmatic side, the high costs of college tuition, combined with current
restrictions on government financial aid, may make private enforcement laws unneces-
sary. As explained above, federal financial aid is restricted to citizens or legal
permanent residents;' 03 additionally, some states expressly prohibit undocumented
students from receiving in-state tuition rates.' 4 With no access to government grants,
loans, or in many cases, to in-state tuition rates, the cost of a college education may
simply be unattainable for most undocumented students. Thus, under the current
system, there may already be enough public restrictions that suppress undocumented
enrollment such that private enforcement laws may be perceived by legislatures as
unnecessary.
The statistics support this explanation. According to Michael A. Olivas, Director of
the Institute for Higher Education Law and Governance at the University of Houston
and Professor of Law, approximately 25,000 undocumented students are enrolled in
American public universities and colleges, and only 200 are enrolled in private
institutions. 10 5 Professor Olivas estimates that there are an additional 50,000 to 75,000
more qualified students who want to attend college but are discouraged for financial
private funding. See H.B. 1864, 93d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006). The bill passed the
House but died in the Senate. Mo. H.R. Activity History for HB1864, available at http://
www.house.mo.gov/bills06l/action/aHB1864.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008). And in 2002, the then-
Attorney General of Virginia, Jerry Kilgore, issued a memo advising Virginia's public colleges and
universities to deny admission to undocumented students and to report them to federal immigration
authorities. OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., COMMONWEALTH OF VA., IMMIGRATION LAW COMPLIANCE UPDATE 1
(Sept. 5, 2002), available at http://schev.virginia.gov/AdminFaculty/ImmigrationMemo9-5-02APL.pdf.
The constitutional authority of Virginia's public universities and colleges to deny admission to
undocumented students has been upheld. See Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 614
(E.D. Va. 2004).
101. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
102. Id. at 215, 230.
103. See supra note 99.
104. Arizona, Mississippi, and Virginia have passed laws prohibiting undocumented students from
receiving in-state tuition at public colleges and university. Ten states (California, Illinois, Kansas,
Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Washington) extend in-state tuition
rates to undocumented students. Elizabeth Redden, An In-State Tuition Debate, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC.,
Feb. 28, 2007, available at http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/02/28/immigration. For more on the
in-state tuition debate, see Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, the Dream Act, and Undocumented College'
Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435 (2004).
105. Catherine Hausman & Victoria Goldman, Great Expectations, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 8, 2001, at 4A.
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and immigration-related reasons from doing so.'06
There have been efforts, past and pending, to challenge Plyler and prohibit
undocumented students from attending elementary and secondary schools. In
1994, California voters passed Proposition 187, which, among other things,
barred public elementary and secondary schools from enrolling undocumented
children.10 7 Proposition 187 also required school officials to report to federal
immigration authorities all students and parents suspected of illegal status.
Citing Plyler, the district court invalidated the bar on education; the court also
struck down the reporting provisions on preemption grounds.' 08 The case was
finally settled by special mediation, with both sides accepting the district court's
decision.109 And in Texas, proposed legislation would have prohibited children
born in Texas to undocumented parents from attending public secondary schools
and colleges, even though their birth in Texas makes them U.S. citizens." 0
Most recently, county supervisors and school board members in Prince William
County, Virginia, have discussed denying public education to undocumented
students, as part of an approved county measure that denies county services to
undocumented immigrants generally."'
These laws would not have required private enforcement per se (because only
public schools would be affected), but they may indicate the tenor of future
private enforcement laws. 1
2
b. Medical Care. In the medical care field, hospital administrators and doctors
have been successful in defeating proposed private enforcement laws. They have
argued convincingly that doctors, nurses, and workers should not be turned into
border agents. Says Terri McCabe Retana, marketing representative for Brownsville
Medical Center in Texas, "Nurses and doctors working in our nation's hospitals are in
the business of saving people's lives. We're caregivers, not police.""A
3
One noteworthy defeat in the U.S. Congress was of House Resolution 3722,
introduced by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher in 2004.'14 This bill would have required
hospitals seeking federal reimbursement for care provided to undocumented
106. Id.
107. Cal. Prop. 187 (1994) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 113-14).
108. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 . Supp. 755, 786-87 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
109. Patrick J. McDonnell, Davis Won't Appeal Prop. 187 Ruling, Ending Court Battles, L.A. TIMEs,
July 29, 1999, at Al.
110. H.B. 28, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007). On January 29, 2007, the bill was referred to the
State Affairs Committee, where it died. Tex. Leg. Online, History: H.B. 28, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
BillLookuplHistory.aspx?LegSess=80R&Bill=HB28 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
111. Ian Shapira, Immigrants'Access to Schools Is Discussed; Supervisors' Say Would Be Limited,
WASH. POST, July 15, 2007, at PWO1.
112. If enacted, these laws would be very vulnerable to legal challenge based on equal protection,
due process, and federal preemption grounds.
113. Angeles Negrete Lares, Proposal Would Require Hospitals To Report Immigrants' Status to
Government, BROWNSvILLE HERALD, May 14, 2004.
114. H.R. Res. 3722, 108th Cong. (2004).
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patients to ask whether patients are U.S. citizens before providing care.' 15
Non-citizens unable to provide a Green Card or other proof of legal status
would have to be fingerprinted or photographed by the hospital, and this
information would be made available to ICE officials, who could initiate
deportations. Undocumented patients would also be required to disclose their
employers, who then would be required to pay for their employees' care. The
bill also prohibited hospitals from providing most types of medical treatment,
unless the care was needed to "protect the health and safety" of U.S. citizens.
1 6
The American Hospital Association and other medical industry groups lobbied
fiercely against. this bill, with the result that the bill was soundly defeated, 331
to 88.117
In 2004, these same groups, along with advocates for immigrants, were also
successful in persuading the Bush Administration to drop rules that would have
required hospitals applying for federal reimbursement to ask patients about their
immigration status. 1 8 Unlike H.R. 3722, these proposed rules did not compel
hospitals to report data about specific patients to federal authorities, but they did
require hospitals to ask about citizenship status and method of entry to the
United States to ensure that the federal reimbursements were being used for
their intended purpose (that is, to reimburse hospitals for care provided to
undocumented patients). '9
The National Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems, which
represents more than 100 safety-net hospitals that provide care to the uninsured,
criticized these proposed rules as creating "peril for [undocumented immi-
grants], a public health threat to the entire community, and higher costs for
treating patients at later disease stages."' 20 In response to these protests, the
Administration agreed to allow hospitals instead to collect documentation like
Social Security numbers and foreign driver's licenses that would indirectly
indicate immigration status.
121
When hospitals do deny care based on immigration status, they are doing so
voluntarily for financial reasons, rather than being compelled by private enforce-
ment laws to do so. For example, JPS Health Network, a public hospital in Fort
Worth, Texas, requires foreign-born patients to demonstrate legal immigration
status before providing financial assistance for non-emergency care, like elec-
115. The reimbursement is part of a federal program that started in 2005 to distribute $1 billion over
four years to hospitals that provide medical care to undocumented patients. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar,
Hospitals To Get Funds for ER Care; Southland Facilities Are Expected To Receive $35 Million To
Help Cover the Cost of Treating Uninsured Illegal Immigrants, L.A. Tb4ES, May 10, 2005, at 1.
116. Zachary Coile, Hospitals Won't Be Required To Report Illegals, S.F. CHRON., May 19, 2004, at
A3.
117. Id.
118. Mark Sherman, Patient Status Kept out of ERs; The Government Had Wanted To Use the
Immigration Question To Assess Funding Eligibility, HousToN CHRON., Oct. 10, 2004, at A2 1.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see also Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 115.
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tive surgery and treatment for chronic or routine illnesses. 22 In January 2004,
the hospital's board of managers voted to extend its financial assistance program
to all county residents, regardless of immigration status, but reversed course
eight months later, as undocumented patients started to fill the hospital. 23
c. Charity and Other Services. There also seems to be some legislative
interest in expanding private enforcement laws into charitable work. Federal
law has long prohibited legal service agencies which receive Legal Services
Corporation funding from providing legal services to undocumented clients.
124
More recently, the Virginia House passed House Bill 2937, which prohibited
charities receiving state or local government funding from using those funds to
provide services to undocumented immigrants. 125 Charities that violated H.B.
2937 would have been ineligible for all future public funding. 126 Charities could
still provide services to undocumented immigrants from private funds, but as
Major James Allison, General Secretary of the Virginia Division of the Salva-
tion Army acknowledged, many charities would have no choice but to turn
people away if the bill is approved: "Our main desire is to get service to people
who need it, without discrimination, but we have to comply by state, federal and
local guidelines as it relates to funding, so we would have to tighten up.' 12 7 To
the extent that undocumented immigrants are perceived as dependent on chari-
table services, legislatures may become more interested in expanding private
enforcement laws in this area.
H. AN EFFECtiVE IMMIGRATION LAW POLICY?
A. DEFINING CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
In order to determine whether private enforcement laws have been or will be
effective immigration law policy, it is important to define the criteria by which
to measure their success. The criteria used here are largely drawn from the goals
articulated by the governments themselves in passing the laws. And those
122. Julia Preston, Texas Hospitals Reflect the Debate on Immigration, N.Y TtmEs, July 18, 2006, at
Al.
123. Id.
124. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (2007). There are limited exceptions, for example, for clients who are
victims of domestic violence. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.4(a)(1) (2007). Though this federal law has other
disturbing public policy implications, it doesn't raise the same private enforcement concerns because
legal services agencies have the legal training to be able to make correct determinations about
immigration status and, because of the nature of their work, are unlikely to engage in alienage or
citizenship discrimination.
125. H.B. 2937, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007).
126. Id.
127. Tim Craig, Va. House Approves Bill on Illegal Immigration, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2007, at A01;
see also H.B. 2937, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007). The bill was referred to the Senate
Committee on Rehabilitation and Social Services, where it was passed by indefinitely. Va. Gen.
Assemb. Legislative Information System, H.B. 2937, available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/
legp504.exe?ses=071&typ= bil&val=hb2937 (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
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criteria are whether the laws can effectively decrease illegal immigration,
punish private parties perceived to be benefiting from illegal immigration, and
convey a strong message about the importance of immigration law enforcement.
By far, the most important criterion is to decrease illegal immigration. Every
government passing private enforcement legislation has articulated as an impor-
tant goal the desire to stem the flow of undocumented immigrants into the
country. For some governments, this goal is more localized-to force.undocu-
mented immigrants from their jurisdictions, even if that means that the immi-
grants move into neighboring jurisdictions. Louis Barletta, mayor of Hazleton,
Pennsylvania, says that he wants to make the city "the toughest place on illegal
immigrants in America." "And I will get rid of the illegal people," he empha-
sizes. "It's this simple: They must leave."1
1 28
Another criterion to consider is the extent to which private parties perceived
to be benefiting from illegal immigration are punished under these private
enforcement laws. In addition to penalizing undocumented immigrants (by
denying them access to employment, housing, and transportation), some legisla-
tures have expressed a desire to punish those whom they believe to be unfairly
profiting from illegal immigration. Consider that even before IRCA became law,
undocumented immigrants could not work legally; employers, however, faced
no penalty for hiring them. 129 Some commentators have suggested that address-
ing this anomaly-making employers, as well as employees, subject to penalties
for engaging in the employment relationship-motivated the passage of the
employer sanctions.
1 30
In the context of employment-related laws, the punitive motive seems fueled
by concerns that employers who hire undocumented workers are gaining an
unfair advantage over other employers, presumably by paying lower wages with
worse working conditions. That motive seems to be true of Suffolk County,
New York, which passed a law requiring all entities with county contracts to
verify their employees' legal status.13 1 In explaining passage of the law, Suffolk
County Executive Steve Levy echoed this punitive sentiment: "While we in
Suffolk County cannot do the federal government's job in enforcing this for
every business throughout our county, we can and should make sure that
companies doing business with the county are abiding by the law and are not
getting a competitive advantage through the illegal underground economy."
' 132
Separate from the actual effect of the private enforcement laws, the third
criterion is to consider the laws' symbolic effect. Laws that do not achieve their
functional purposes (for example, deterring illegal immigration) may still have
128. Michael Powell & Michelle Garcia, Pa. City Puts Illegal Immigrants on Notice, WASH. POST,
Aug. 22, 2006, at A03 (emphasis in the original).
129. See Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and
Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 669, 681 (1997).
130. See, e.g., id.
131. Suffolk County, N.Y., Local Law No. 52-2006 (Aug. 8, 2006).
132. Bart Jones, Immigrant Job Bill Called Redundant, NEWSDAY, Sept. 1, 2006.
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an important symbolic role. 33 Symbolism appears to have played an important
role in the passage of many private enforcement laws. A theme running through
many of the private enforcement laws is a get-tough immigration enforcement
message, directed at 'various audiences: constituents, Congress and federal
immigration authorities, those who profit from illegal immigration, and/or the
immigrants themselves. 
134
For some legislatures, the symbolic effect of the laws may even be more important
than their practical impact. For example, when interviewing members of Congress
involved in drafting key IRCA provisions, researchers found that the drafters were
most concerned with establishing the legal principle that employers could not hire
undocumented workers, "regardless of whether it was financially, technically, or
politically possible to enforce it rigorously in the short run. '35
Finally, the benefits of private enforcement laws must be weighed against
their costs. A private enforcement law may be able to meet some or all of the
criteria articulated above, but its success, ultimately, is measured by weighing
its benefits against its costs. Chief among these potential costs are discrimina-
tion based on national origin, citizenship, or other protected category. The
concern here is that private enforcers, acting from discriminatory animus, risk
aversion, or confusion, will deny benefits to lawfully present persons because
they are foreign-born or simply appear to be so. Other possible costs include the
administrative costs incurred by private enforcers as they learn and then apply
the laws and the diversion of societal resources away from other, perhaps more
effective enforcement strategies.
B. EVALUATING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
Are private enforcement laws an effective immigration law policy? Though
many of these laws are of recent vintage, we can draw upon lessons learned
from federal employer sanctions. These sanctions provide a good case study
because they have been implemented nationally, with substantial federal re-
sources, and their impact over twenty-one years has been widely studied.
136
What the studies show is that the sanctions have not decreased illegal immigra-
133. See generally David Garland, Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of Criminal
Justice, 11 STUD. L. POL. & Soc. 191 (1991) (arguing that punishment plays an active role in the
generative process that produces culture). But see Margaret Taylor, Symbolic Detention, in XX IN
DEFENSE OF THE ALEN 153 (1997) (arguing that immigration detention implemented for symbolic
reasons--to restore credibility to the immigration system-is unfair and ineffective and results in harsh
detention conditions).
134. See infra section II.B.3.
135. MrcHAEL Fix & PAUL T. Hn. ENFORCING EMpLoYER SANcnoNs: CHALLENGES AND SmATEGIES 39 (1990).
136. When Congress passed the employer sanctions, it also required that their effects be studied in
three annual reports, beginning one year after enactment. Specifically, Congress asked the then-General
Accounting Office (GAO) to determine whether (1) sanctions have been implemented satisfactorily,
(2) a pattern of discrimination has resulted against eligible workers seeking employment, and (3) the
sanctions created an unnecessary regulatory burden for employers. INA § 274A(j)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§1324a(j)(1) (repealed 1996).
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tion, have not resulted in any significant punishment of law-breaking employ-
ers, and have caused substantial discrimination against employees.137 The
sanctions' sole success appears to be a symbolic one: establishing the legal
principle that employment of unauthorized workers is itself a legal violation (one that
penalizes both employers and employees) and underlining the nation's commitment to
border control. 138 But as employer sanctions continue to be plagued by numerous
enforcement problems, the viability of even that symbolism is at risk.
The dismal experience of federal employer sanctions offers some sobering
insights into the potential effectiveness of private enforcement laws generally.
Because they rely on private parties to screen for immigration status, private
enforcement laws are vulnerable to the same enforcement problems--enforcer
confusion and fraudulent documents-that have undermined federal employer
sanctions. These enforcement problems strongly suggest that, like federal em-
ployer sanctions, private enforcement laws will not substantially decrease ille-
gal immigration. 
139
These other private enforcement laws may have some advantage in that there
appears to be more political will to enforce the laws, particularly those enacted
at the local level.' 40 Though the possible result for some laws may be higher
enforcement rates and more significant penalties assessed, the main impact of
private enforcement is likely to be symbolic: sending tough immigration mes-
sages to the federal government, undocumented immigrants, and fellow commu-
nity members. 14 ' And when weighed against the administrative and discriminatory
costs of private enforcement (which are exacerbated by the decentralized nature of
other private enforcement laws), these nominal benefits strongly suggest that private
enforcement laws are not an effective immigration policy.
1. Impact on Illegal Immigration
a. Federal Employer Sanctions. After twenty-one years, the almost unani-
mous conclusion is that federal employer sanctions have not significantly
reduced or deterred illegal immigration. The Migration Policy Institute de-
scribes employer sanctions as "notoriously ineffective," noting that "employers
view the threat of actual punishment under the current system as an acceptable
business expense."'142 And the Government Accountability Office, which con-
cluded in 1990 that sanctions had slowed illegal immigration, '4 3 warned in
2006 that "ongoing weaknesses [in the employment verification process] have
137. See infra sections II.B.1, II.B.2, II.B.4.
138. See infra section II.B.3.
139. See infra section H.B.
140. See infra section H.B.1.b.ii.
141. See infra section II.B.3.
142. MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AT THE WORKSITE:
MAKING IT WORK 1 (2005), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/PolicyBrief-6-
Rosenblum.pdf.
143. GAO 1990 DISCRIMINATION REPORT, supra note 15, at 3.
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undermined its effectiveness" and that employers who circumvent the sanctions
face little chance of prosecution. 1" Finally, Professors Aleinikoff, Martin, and
Motomura conclude: "Whatever the goals (and hopes) of the Congress that put
the employer sanctions regime in place in 1986, the statutory provisions have
plainly failed of their purpose."145 .
Obviously, this was not the result Congress intended. The Select Committee
on Immigration and Refugee Policy, appointed by President Jimmy Carter in
1978 to study immigration reform, endorsed employer sanctions as one of the
only effective enforcement tools. 146 When immigration reform was debated
pre-IRCA, employer sanctions were touted by their congressional supporters as
being "an integral part of effective immigration reform."
' 147
According to their advocates, employer sanctions would haye two distinct
advantages, as compared with other immigration enforcement tools. First, by
making jobs in the United States more difficult to obtain, the sanctions would
lessen the "pull" factor of higher-wage employment and thus decrease illegal
immigration. 148 Second, the sanctions would benefit from the multiplied enforce-
ment efforts of the nation's employers, without requiring direct government
expenditure. In effect, we could get more and more effective immigration
enforcement "on the cheap."
' 149
Despite these advantages, however, employer sanctions have not significantly
reduced or deterred illegal immigration. Employer sanctions are rarely enforced,
difficult to prosecute, and often circumvented with fraudulent documents. And
as explained below, some of these enforcement problems are intertwined with
the touted advantages of employer sanctions. While employer sanctions have
been plagued with enforcement problems, the undocumented population in the
144. U.S. Gov'T.AccouNTABILrrY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: WEAKNEssEs HwIaR EMPLOY-
MENT VERIFICATION AND WORKsrrE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 21 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d0685t.pdf [hereinafter GAO, WEAKNESSES HINDER].
145. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALFaNmoFF, DAvm A. MARTIN & HmRostu MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND
CrrIzENsH': PROCESS AND POLICY 1140 (5th ed. 2003); see also Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the
Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 193 (arguing
that employer sanctions have not deterred illegal immigration and have not protected U.S. workers).
146. SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION PoLIcY AND THE NATIONAL
INTEREST xvii (Mar. 1, 1981).
147. Daniel E. Lungren & Hamilton Fish Jr., Employer Sanctions Are Key to Immigration Reform,
N.Y TbMEs, Feb. 11, 1986, at A30. The writers were members of the House Judiciary Committee.
148. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE AFFAIRS OF THE COMM. ON THE SENATE
JUDICIARY, 102d CONG., OPTIONS FOR AN IMPROVED EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION SYSTEM (Comm. Print
1992), cited in Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration Reform
and ControlAct of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIR. L.J. 343, 360 & n.151 (1994).
149. In congressional hearings during the confirmation of Attorney General candidate Zod Baird,
Senator James Heflin summarized the purposes of IRCA: "[T]his concept of employer sanctions was
determined by the supporters of the bill to be the primary method of enforcement as opposed to
employing a great number of immigration agents who would be seeking out illegal aliens ... which
would in effect, bring about a much less expensive method of enforcement." Nomination of Zoe E.
Baird, of Connecticut, To Be Attorney General of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 111-12 (1993) (statement of Sen. Howell Heflin, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
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United States continues to grow by approximately 400,000 people every year.'50
Combined, these trends strongly suggest that employer sanctions have not
effectively deterred or reduced illegal immigration.
The biggest enforcement problem for employer sanctions is simply that they
are rarely enforced. For example, in 1999, the INS dedicated only nine percent
of its total enforcement efforts to worksite enforcement; by 2003, that percent-
age dropped to a dismal four percent of total enforcement. 151 In concrete terms,
this means that in 1999, INS issued 417 notices of intent to fine (NIF)1 52 to
employers and arrested 2849 unauthorized workers at worksites. In 2003, ICE
(the successor agency to the INS for interior enforcement) issued just 162 NIFs
and arrested 445 unauthorized workers. 
153
There are several explanations for these low enforcement rates. The first
explanation (and perhaps the most obvious) is that workplace enforcement is
simply not a priority. Immigration law enforcement has always focused on
securing the borders, with interior enforcement a distant second priority. Even
within the realm of interior enforcement, federal immigration authorities have
focused more on catching criminal immigrants than those who work illegally
(and employers who hire them).154 The security focus of interior enforcement
intensified after 9/11, with workplace enforcement concentrated on airports,
power plants, and other workplaces deemed to have national security implications, but
which traditionally have not attracted many undocumented workers.' 55
The second explanation for low workplace enforcement rates is found within
150. MICHAEL HoEFER, NANCY RYTINA & CHRISTOPHER CAMPBELL, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2005,
at 1 (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/asset5/statistics/publicationsAILLPE-2005.pdf
[hereinafter DHS JAN. 2005 EsTIMAm].
151. GAO, WEAKNESSES HINDER, supra note 144, at 14.
152. A notice of intent to fine is issued if, after an investigation, ICE finds that the employer has
violated provisions in the employer sanctions laws. The notice contains the basis for the notice, the
charges against the employer, the statutory provisions that the employer has violated, and the fine
imposed. 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.9(d)(1), 1274a.9(d)(1) (2007). The employer can request a hearing before an
administrative law judge to contest the charges and the fine. 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.9(e), 1274a.9(e) (2007).
153. GAO, WEAKNESSES HINDER, supra note 144, at 16-17. It should also be noted that in 2004, ICE
issued just three NIFs. Id. at 16. In August 2007, the Bush Administration announced new rules,
requiring employers who receive notice that their employees' Social Security information does not
match the Social Security Administration's records ("no-match letters") to fire those employees within
ninety days if the employees cannot show valid Social Security identification. Previously, employers
were not obligated to take action against employees cited in these letters, but under the proposed rules,
employers who fail to fire cited employees face civil and criminal penalties. This attempt to step up
employer sanction enforcement has been mired in legal challenges, however. In August 2007, a federal
judge temporarily barred the Social Security Administration from sending the no-match letters out
because of concerns that the SSA and the Department of Homeland Security had overstepped their
authority in issuing the rule. Julia Preston, Rules on Hiring Illegal Workers Are Delayed, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2007, at A10; Julia Preston, Social Security Warns of Logjam from Immigration Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at A20.
154. By the late 1990s, ICE was dedicating more resources to criminal alien cases than any other
enforcement activity. GAO, WEAKNESSES HINDER, supra note 144, at 17.
155. See id. at 18.
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the employer sanction laws themselves. As explained previously, compliance
with the administrative requirements provides employers with an affirmative
defense against substantive violations, making prosecutions more difficult.
156
For all practical purposes then, as long as an employer does a cursory check of
an employee's documents and files an 1-9 form,' 57 she is protected from charges
of substantive violations, even if the documents turn out to be fraudulent.
These low enforcement rates seem to reflect national ambivalence about
employer sanctions and our commitment to eliminating employment as a pull
factor for illegal immigration. Employer sanctions have been debated since the
1950s (with the first serious proposal advanced in 1971), but the lack of a
natural constituency stalled passage for almost forty years.158 Few interest
groups, outside of labor unions and immigration restrictionist organizations,
saw themselves as directly benefiting from the enforcement of employer sanc-
tions.159 Moreover, many Americans viewed the hiring of unauthorized workers
as a morally neutral activity.' 60 So while popular pressure existed to reduce
illegal immigration and to "regain control of our borders,"' 6 ' there was no
broad political consensus that employer sanctions were the appropriate tool to
use.
On the other side, legislators faced strong opposition from businesses. Employ-
ers' objections were three-fold: the sanctions would impose onerous administra-
tive responsibilities on employers; employers could be held civilly and criminally
liable for innocent hiring decisions; and most importantly, the sanctions would
cut employers off from much-needed immigrant labor. 162 Among the most vocal
business opponents were the Chamber of Commerce and the Western Growers'
Association.'
63
To minimize employer opposition, Congress included provisions in the legis-
lation-the affirmative defense clause and the knowing hire clause-that mini-
156. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
157. When an employer completes and signs an 1-9 form, she certifies to the following: "I attest,
under penalty of perjury, that I have examined the document(s) presented by the above-named
employee, that the above-listed documents appear to be genuine and to relate to the employee named,
that the employee began employment on [date] and that to the best of my knowledge the employee is
eligible to work in the United States." U.S. CrrIzENSHM AND IMMGRATION SERVICE, DEPT. OF HOMELAND
SEC., FoRm 1-9 EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILrrY VERFCATION (2005) (emphasis added).
158. Fix & HILL, supra note 135, at 50; see also Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations:
Toward a Dialectical Model of White Collar Crime, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1041, 1057 (1990)
(discussing the hearings held by Rep. Peter Rodino on illegal immigration).
159. Fix & HILL, supra note 135, at 50.
160. Id.
161. In signing IRCA into law, President Ronald Reagan praised the legislation: "Future generations
of Americans will be thankful for our efforts to humanely regain control of our borders and thereby
preserve the value of one of the most sacred possessions of our people, American citizenship." Robert
Pear, President Signs Landmark Bill on Immigration, N.Y TWMES, Nov. 7, 1986, at A12.
162. See Fix & HILL, supra note 135, at 27-29; see also Calavita, supra note 158, at 1057-59
(discussing employers' concerns about their potential liability when employees show false documents).
163. Calavita, supra note 158, at 1057.
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mized employer liability.1 6" The purpose, according to Gerald Riso (then INS
deputy commissioner), was to encourage voluntary compliance: "We have made
some assumptions that most employers will voluntarily comply if we make
compliance pragmatically easy for them."'165 But by including these provisions,
as Professor Kitty Calavita suggests, Congress guaranteed that compliance and
violations would occur. "The point here is not simply that Congress passed a
toothless law by making compliance easy through the incorporation of loop-
holes. Rather, the law in effect made violations pragmatically easy."
1 66
Besides these provisions, effective enforcement of employer sanctions has
also been undermined by the proliferation of counterfeit documents. The center-
piece of the sanctions system is the employer's verification of an employee's
proffered document (or documents) to prove identity and work eligibility.
1 67
Counterfeit documents circumvent the verification system in two important
ways: (1) good faith employers are deceived by the documents into hiring
unauthorized workers, and (2) bad faith employers knowingly hire unauthorized
workers and use the documents as a shield against prosecution for substantive
violations. 168 Employer confusion and fraud are the predictable downsides of
the multiplier effect when employers who receive no immigration training are
responsible for determining the genuineness of immigration and other govern-
ment documents. Further complicating the problem is that twenty-seven differ-
ent documents can be used to prove identity and work eligibility, providing
more opportunities for confusion and fraud. 1
69
Just a sampling of enforcement actions shows how widespread counterfeit
documents are. In a roughly two-year period, between October 1, 1996 and May
29, 1998, INS conducted 3500 investigations in which it found 78,000 fraudu-
lent documents used to obtain employment for 50,000 unauthorized employ-
ees.' 70 In about 60% of these cases, INS found that the employer had complied
with the verification process and had not knowingly hired unauthorized work-
ers. 17 1 Of the 78,000 fraudulent documents, 60% were INS documents like
permanent resident cards, 36% were Social Security cards, and the remaining
4% were other documents like drivers' licenses.' 72 And in thirty fraud cases
investigated during a five-year period (1990-1995), INS confiscated nearly
164. Id. at 1059.
165. Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal citation omitted).
166. Id. at 1060 (emphasis in the original) (internal quotations omitted).
167. An employer is required to attest that the employee's document (or documents) "reasonably
appears on its face to be genuine." INA § 274A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A) (2000).
168. For more information about the shield effect, see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
169. See 8 C.F.R. § 1274a.2 (2007). The General Accountability Office, among other entities, has
recommended that the number of documents accepted for employment verification be reduced to
minimize fraud. See GAO, WEAKNESSES HINDER, supra note 144, at 8-9.
170. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL AuIENs: SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES TO REDUCING UNAUTHO-
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300,000 counterfeit documents, almost all of which were confiscated in Los
Angeles. 173 Finally, in November 1998, INS seized two million counterfeit
documents; the seizure took place in Los Angeles but the documents were
headed to different distribution points across the country.
1 74
When viewed against this background of enforcement problems, the contin-
ued growth in the undocumented population strongly suggests that the sanctions
have not reduced or deterred illegal immigration. 175 Consider that the number
of undocumented immigrants in the United States has more than doubled since
the employer sanctions went into effect. According to Urban Institute estimates,
there were between three million and five million undocumented immigrants in
the United States in 1986, when employer sanctions were passed. 176 By 2006,
estimates of the undocumented population ranged from eleven million 177 to
twelve million. 1
78
There is some evidence that employer sanctions slowed the flow of undocu-
mented immigrants into this country, but that effect seems to have been tempo-
rary. In a 1990 report to Congress, the General Accounting Office concluded
that employer sanctions have "apparently reduced illegal immigration."' 179 GAO
based its conclusion in large part on a July 1989 study by the Urban Institute
that found employer sanctions had slowed the rate of undocumented migration
across the southern border into- the United States.180 In analyzing a monthly
time series of Border Patrol apprehensions, 18 1 the Urban Institute determined
173. Id. at 10&n.10.
174. Id. at 10.
175. Of course, the increased growth of undocumented immigrants does not, by itself, prove whether
employer sanctions have successfully deterred illegal immigration because we do not know with
certainty what the size of the undocumented population would have been in the absence of sanctions.
However, the magnitude of the increase, (doubling or tripling, depending on the estimates used), taken
together with the numerous enforcement problems that employer sanctions have experienced, strongly
suggests that sanctions have not had the intended deterrent effect. See Wishnie, supra note 145, at 206
(growth in the undocumented population suggests that employer sanctions have not deterred illegal
immigration).
176. B. LINDSAY LowELL & ROaERTO SuRo, PEw HISPANIC CTR., How MANY UNDOCUaMENED: THE
NUMaERS BEHIND THE U.S.-MEXIco MIGRATION TALKS 4 (Mar. 4, 2002). Social scientists use mathemati-
cal techniques to estimate the undocumented population. The most common method is the residual
method, in which the known legal population of foreign-born residents is subtracted from the total
foreign-born population living in the United States. Population figures are taken from several sources,
including Census data and administrative data gathered by INS and now the Department of Homeland
Security. See DHS JAN. 2005 ESTIMATES, supra note 150, at 1.
177. DHS JAN. 2005 EsTrMvATEs, supra note 150, at 1.
178. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEw HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED
MIGRANT POPULATION IN TE U.S. (Mar. 7, 2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/
report.php?ReportlD=61 (estimating that in March 2006, the undocumented population was between
11.5 and 12 million people).
179. GAO 1990 DISCRIMINATION REPORT, supra note 15, at 3.
180. MICHAEL J. WHITE, FRANK D. BEAN, & THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE, THE URBAN INST., THE U.S.
IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT AND UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION TO TE UNITED STATES 23
(1989).
181. The data examined in this study consisted of the apprehensions made by the Border Patrol of
undocumented immigrants who cross the U.S.-Mexico border without inspection. Id. at 4. Though
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that apprehensions in the two-year period after sanctions took effect declined by
"nearly 700,000 or about 35% below the level that would be anticipated in the
absence of IRCA."'182 Using mathematical models, the Urban Institute con-
cluded that 71% of the decline was attributable to the deterrent effect of
employer -sanctions. 183
Other studies also found clear declines in border crossings (as measured by
apprehensions data) in the post-IRCA period that they could attribute to IRCA.
These different studies attributed anywhere from 21% to 47% of the declines to
IRCA's impact.184 And in a joint study conducted by the Rand Corporation and
the Urban Institute, researchers looking at various indicators (apprehensions
statistics, applications for business and tourist visas, and a labor market study)
suggested that the deterrent effect of employer sanctions may have been tempo-
rary at best.
1 85
The bottom line seems to be that the sanctions deterred illegal immigration
when first passed but that the deterrent effect was only temporary, as enforce-
ment problems developed. The caution urged by the authors of the 1989 Urban
Institute study cited by GAO seems particularly prescient: "[I]f the enforcement
of the employer sanctions provisions proves ineffective as a result of insuffi-
cient INS resources and INS personnel and as a result of a continuing high
demand for undocumented labor, the deterrent efficacy of IRCA might be
expected to deteriorate over time."
'' 86
apprehensions do not measure the number of undocumented immigrants in the U.S., they are frequently
cited as evidence of the flow of illegal immigration. In essence, apprehensions reflect the portion of the
migratory flow that is captured by the Border Patrol and thus provide some rough estimate of the
number of successful crossers. Jeffrey S. Passel, Frank D. Bean & Barry Edmonston, Assessing the
Impact of Employer Sanctions on Undocumented Immigration to the United States, in THE PAPER
CURTAIN: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS: IMPLEMENTATION, IMPACT, AND REFORM 193, 200 (Michael Fix ed., 1991).
182. WHITE ET AL., supra note 180, at 20.
183. Twelve percent of the decline was attributable to increased INS enforcement efforts and 17%
attributable to the SAWs (seasonal agricultural workers) program (1.3 million undocumented agricul-
tural workers received legal status under this program and thus no longer needed to cross illegally). Id.;
see also LowELL & SURo, supra note 176, at 4 (discussing the legalization provisions of IRCA).
184. Passel, Bean & Edmonston, supra note 181, at 202.
185. For example, these researchers found mixed apprehensions data, with a resurgence in apprehen-
sions in 1988 and a decline again in 1989. They suggested that the legalization programs, by legalizing
the status of those who would otherwise have to cross illegally, may explain the decline in apprehen-
sions in 1989. KErrH CRANE ET AL., RAND CORP. & URBAN INST., THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS ON
THE FLOw OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES 71-73 (1990).
186. WHrrE ET AL., supra note 180, at 21. In reaching its conclusion in 1990 that employer sanctions
have deterred illegal immigration, GAO also relied on surveys of employers, unauthorized workers
arrested at worksites, and Mexicans living in Mexico that suggested the sanctions had made it harder
for unauthorized workers to find employment in the U.S. GAO 1990 DISCRIMINATION REPORT, supra note
15, at 103. But a 2004-2005 survey conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center found that Mexican
immigrants have little trouble finding work. The Center surveyed 4836 individuals who were applying
for matricula consular cards (identity cards issued by Mexican consulates) across the U.S. and found
that 95% of those who had been in the United States for more than six months were employed. Family
and social networks were keys to helping new immigrants find work. RAKESH KOCHHAR, PEW HIsPANiC
CTR., SURVEY OF MEXICAN MIGRANTS: THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION TO AMERICA ii (2005). For more on
employers' assessments of the sanctions, see infra note 215 and accompanying text.
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b. Private Enforcement Laws
i. Pull of Market Forces. Extrapolating from our experience with federal
employer sanctions, it is clear that market forces are a formidable hurdle for
private enforcement laws. Experts agree that employment is the most important
factor drawing undocumented immigrants to the United States; yet federal
employer sanctions have been unable to slow the flow of illegal immigration
into the country. It seems improbable then to expect that private enforcement
laws denying less important benefits-housing, for example-can have the
deterrent effect that federal employer sanctions have been unable to achieve.
The deterrent rationale of private enforcement laws is that by denying certain
benefits to undocumented immigrants, immigrants already here will be encour-
aged to go home and would-be immigrants will be discouraged from leaving in
the first place. But as our experience with federal employer sanctions has
demonstrated, this rationale collapses in the face of market forces. Employers
continue to need access to cheap labor (authorized or not), and undocumented
workers continue to need work. So the political result is a weakened employer
sanctions system that is difficult to enforce, and the economic result is contin-
ued employment of large numbers of undocumented workers.
Legal access to housing, transportation, and even medical care certainly
makes living in the United States more comfortable for undocumented immi-
grants, but access to these benefits is not a pull factor of the same magnitude
that employment is. Denying legal-access to these benefits-as private enforce-
ment laws seek to do-may deter illegal immigration around the margins. But
our experience with federal employer sanctions suggests that most undocu-
mented immigrants will, perhaps after a temporary period of adjustment, find
substitutes for the legal access (for example, using fraudulent documents or
going underground to find landlords who do not require documents) or do
without these restricted benefits altogether, as long as jobs are still available.
The likely result of private enforcement, then, is little or no immigration
deterrence and a large undocumented population living without legal access to
essential benefits. 
1 87
ii. Enforcement Challenges. Even if denying benefits could theoretically deter
or reduce illegal immigration, the laws are likely to face significant enforcement
problems that could undermine their effectiveness. Again drawing from the
experience of federal employer sanctions, the enforcement problems that can be
anticipated are (1) private enforcers who are confused about the immigration
status determinations they are obligated to make and (2) the prevalence of
187. In striking down the Texas law that prohibited undocumented children from attending public
schools, the Supreme Court expressed great concern about creating a "permanent caste" of undocu-
mented immigrants, exploited for their labor but denied access to essential benefits like education. "The
existence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself on
adherence to principles of equality under law." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982).
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fraudulent documents, which can undermine even good faith enforcement ef-
forts. The effect of these -enforcement problems is likely to be both under-
enforcement (that is, some unauthorized immigrants are granted benefits) and
over-enforcement (that is, citizens and authorized inmmigrants are denied ben-
efits).
Because most of these private enforcement laws provide no guidance to the
private parties charged with enforcement duties, enforcer confusion is certain to
be high. In the GAO survey of employers, 15.1% of employers thought that the
1-9 verification form was generally unclear or very unclear.1 88 Similarly, 12% of
employers were generally unclear or very unclear about the types of documents
that could be presented as evidence of work authorization.1 89 As confusing as
the 1-9 may be, it at least provides some guidance to employers. When private
enforcement laws extend beyond employment, enforcer confusion is bound to
be higher because there is not even a form analogous to the 1-9 to help enforcers
determine whether persons applying for benefits are legally present.
Moreover, the group of people who are legally present and eligible for these
other benefits is larger than the group eligible for employment, further exacerbat-
ing enforcer confusion. For example, a student in the United States on an F-1
student visa is not permitted to work off-campus unless she can demonstrate
severe economic hardship and obtains an employment authorization document
from CIS (Customs and Immigration Services).' 90 But based on her student
status alone (as demonstrated by an unexpired student visa), she is legally
present and is eligible to rent a home, travel within the United States, and
engage in other economic activity here. Would a private enforcer without any
legal guidance or training in immigration status be able to make that distinc-
tion? Would a private enforcer even recognize a student visa?
Or what about a temporary visitor from a visa-waiver country? U.S. immigra-
tion laws allow residents from certain countries (mostly in western Europe) to
visit for business or pleasure for up to ninety days without having to obtain a
visa.19' Would a private enforcer know that these visitors are legally present
(and entitled to travel, receive medical care at their own expense, and even rent
short-term housing) by simply looking at their passports? Would a private enforcer
know that Portugal participates in the program but Argentina does not?"92
Enforcer confusion is the predictable downside of the multiplier effect. As
enforcement responsibilities are spread to numerous private parties, these pri-
vate parties will likely experience confusion about the immigration law determi-
nations they are obligated to make. Compounding the problem is that few, if
any, private enforcers have received training in immigration law's complexi-
188. GAO 1990 DISCRIMtNATION REPORT, supra note 15, at 119.
189. Id.
190. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(9) (2007).
191. INA§ 217, 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (2000).
192. For a current list of participating countries, see U.S. Dep't of State, Visa Waiver Program,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html#countries (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
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ties.'9 3 Without training or legal guidance, private parties are bound to make
wrong enforcement decisions, either in good faith or with discriminatory intent
to try to minimize legal liability (for example, not renting to those who "look"
foreign to try to avoid legal penalties altogether).
In response, an advocate of private enforcement might object that the sce-
narios presented above have limited practical application. In most cases, they
would argue, private enforcers will not face complicated immigration situations;
rather, the likely scenario is that a private enforcer will ask an applicant for
proof of legal status and will deny the benefit if the applicant is unable to
provide any proof. Advocates would argue that applicants without proof of legal
status in all likelihood entered without inspection and are, along with those who
overstay their authorized visits, the very people who should be denied benefits.
There are several problems with this argument. First, as an empirical matter,
many authorized visitors come to the United States and fall into many different
visa categories, so the possibility that a private enforcer would encounter, for
example, a student-visa or visa-waiver applicant is real.' 94
Second, the argument assumes that private enforcers will be satisfied with the
production of any immigration documents, and that they therefore do not need
to have any real understanding of immigration law in order to carry out their
enforcement obligations. But that argument begs the question: how will en-
forcers know what immigration documents are permissible, if they have no
immigration law training? Moreover, our experience with employer sanctions
shows that even when presented with valid documentation of legal status, a
significant number of enforcers are likely to raise questions about the adequacy of the
documents, particularly if applicants look or sound foreign.' 95 How then can enforc-
ers determine the validity of documents without immigration training?
Finally, even if we accept the premise that applicants will only be denied
benefits if they are unable to produce any documentation of legal status, it is not
clear that all those who lack documents (or have expired documents) are
necessarily here illegally. For example, someone whose tourist visa has expired
but is married to a U.S. citizen is permitted by Section 245 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act to apply to legalize her status without having to leave the
country.196 As a technical matter, she is illegally present, but under these
193. And Greyhound's experience with training---trying to avoid criminal liability for smuggling but
also to avoid racial profiling practices-shows that training can be problematic too. See supra notes
95-98 and accompanying text.
194. Consider, for example, that in 2005, the U.S. admitted over 620,000 students on F-1 visas and
over 15.8 million visitors through the visa waiver program. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2005
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 66 (2005).
195. In fact, Congress was concerned enough about this issue that it amended § 274B to add a
provision prohibiting employers from asking for more documents than are required by law or of
refusing to honor presented documents that appear reasonably genuine. INA § 274B(a)(6), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324b(a)(6) (2000).
196. See INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2000).
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circumstances, ICE would not initiate removal proceedings. 197 Would she be
eligible for benefits under private enforcement laws? And perhaps more impor-
tantly, how would a private enforcer make that determination?
The other major enforcement problem that private enforcement laws face is
the prevalence of fraudulent documents. The scope and effect of fraudulent
documents on federal employer sanctions has already been described. 98 If most
undocumented immigrants are here to work (and have the fraudulent documents
necessary to obtain employment), then they could use those same fraudulent
documents to obtain other benefits too. Arguably, the potential for fraud in the
non-employment context is higher than what we have seen with employer
sanctions. In the non-employment context, there are more documents that could
be counterfeited to show legal presence (for example, tourist visas), making
verification more difficult. Furthermore, none of the other private enforcement
laws have provisions to train private enforcers about the types of documents
that prove legal presence and what these documents look like.
The one enforcement advantage that local private enforcement laws have is that
there appears to be more political will to enforce these laws, as compared with federal
employer sanctions. These towns, counties, and states are motivated on immigration
issues, often passing private enforcement laws with other anti-illegal-immigrant mea-
sures. And though opinion about the laws is far from unanimous in these communi-
ties, it appears that the laws have broad political support.' 99
Is this political will translating into dedicated resources? Colorado allocated
up to $110,000 and two full-time employees to implement its employment law
and authorized its labor department to conduct random audits of employers to
ensure compliance. 2° Most of the local governments, however, do not have a
plan for systematic enforcement of the laws, relying instead on public corn-
197. See, e.g., Bull v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 790 F.2d 869, 871 (1lth Cir. 1986)
(holding that the Board of Immigration Appeals abused its discretion in denying a continuance so that
an immigrant married to a U.S. citizen could apply to adjust to permanent resident status).
198. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
199. In Farmers Branch, Texas, for example, voters overwhelmingly approved a private enforcement
housing ordinance, by a more than 2-to-I margin. Stephanie Sandoval, FB Immigration Law Wins
Easily, DALLAs MORNc NEws, May 13, 2007, at 1A. In the runup to the vote, groups supporting and
opposing the ordinance formed, and fighting between these groups became emotionally charged. The
Farmers Branch chapter of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) (an anti-ordinance
group) obtained a restraining order against members of Support Farmers Branch (a pro-ordinance
group), accusing the latter of "intimidation, harassment, threats, false accusations and the filing of false
police reports" to try to stop members of the Farmers Branch chapter of LULAC from campaigning
against the ordinance. City Council member Tim O'Hare, the driving force behind the ordinance, called
the restraining order "another example of bullying tactics" by opponents of the ordinance. Stephanie
Sandoval, Backers of Rental Ban Hit with Order, DALLAS MORNING NEws, March 29, 2007, at lB. In a
lawsuit filed by apartment owners and residents in Farmers Branch, a federal judge granted a
preliminary injunction, on the grounds that the ordinance was likely preempted by federal law and was
void for vagueness. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 777
(N.D. Tex. 2007).
200. H.B. 1017, 2006 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (codified at CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-2-122
(2006)).
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plaints to ferret out non-compliance.20 Without financial and human support
dedicated to enforcement, it is questionable how much enforcement these local
governments will net, political support notwithstanding.
iii. Local Effect, No National Impact. Another reason why private enforce-
ment laws are unlikely to reduce or deter illegal immigration is because most of
them are passed and enforced at the local level. The relevant borders to consider
for immigration law purposes are, of course, national borders, and the enforce-
ment of local laws within local jurisdictions does not significantly influence
national patterns of immigration.
There is some anecdotal evidence that immigrant populations have de-
clined in jurisdictions that have passed private enforcement laws. After
Riverside, New Jersey, passed the Illegal Immigration Relief Act in July
2006 (a private enforcement law affecting housing and employment), the
town's population dropped within months from about 8000 to 7000 people.20 2
Local residents said that departing Brazilian immigrants accounted for the
drop, leaving for nearby Philadelphia, Delaware, and Maryland.20 3 In Hazle-
ton, Pennsylvania, even though its housing and employment laws have not
been enforced because of litigation, its mayor guesses that as many as 5000
Latinos have left town.2 4
And in Colorado, state officials have started a pilot program to send prisoners
into fields to harvest crops.20 5 This work is normally done by migrant workers,
but after the state passed some of the nation's strictest immigration restrictions,
farmers expected that about half of their workers would not return to Colo-
rado. 20 6 "There's a feeling, a perception that these laborers won't be back
because it's safer for them to find work in other states," said Frank Sobolik,
director of a Colorado State University program that works with farmers.20 7
Other Colorado businesses like construction companies and carwashes have
also complained of a labor shortage.20 8
201. See, e.g., HAZLETON, PA., ORDiNANCEs 2006-18 (2006) ("An enforcement action shall be
initiated by means of a written signed complaint to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office submitted by
any City official, business entity, or City resident.").
202. Geoff Mulvihill, Since Strict Immigration Law Was Passed, This Town Has Been Quiet,
BURLINGTON COUNTY TtMES, Sept. 27, 2006, available at http://www.njmda.org/press-archive/
sincestrict.php.
203. Id. Faced with an economic downturn and legal challenges, Riverside eventually rescinded its
law. Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
26, 2007, at Al.
204. Ellen Barry, City's Immigration Law Turns Back Clock; Latinos Leave Hazleton, Pa., in Droves
in the Old Coal Town's Crackdown, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 2006, at 10.




208. Nicholas Riccardi, Going Behind Bars for Laborers; After Colorado Passed Laws Targeting
Illegal Immigrants, Field Hands Fled and Crops Rotted. Who Is Left To Work?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2007, at Al.
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What is significant about these reports is that they seem to reflect a shift of
immigrants, rather than a reduction of the total population. Even if we assume
that all or most of the immigrants leaving communities like Riverside, New
Jersey, are undocumented, they appear to be leaving for other jurisdictions
within the United States, rather than leaving the country altogether. For some
communities, reducing or eliminating the undocumented population within their
jurisdictions is a sign of the laws' success. 20 9 Even if we are-willing to accept
local governments creating, in effect, their own immigration jurisdictions, the
impact on immigration patterns would still be local, not national.
2. Punitive Effect
a. Federal Employer Sanctions. Have the sanctions been effective in punish-
ing employers who hire unauthorized workers (and presumably receive a com-
petitive advantage from doing so)? At one level, this question is intertwined
with the earlier inquiry about the ability of sanctions to deter illegal immigra-
tion. After all, if (as this Article has concluded), employer sanctions have not
been an effective deterrent because of numerous enforcement problems, then we
could reasonably deduce that the sanctions have not had their intended punitive
effect. Simply put, sanctions that are rarely enforced cannot be effective in
punishing the targeted wrongdoers.
But the ineffectiveness of the employer sanctions to punish goes beyond just
non-enforcement. Even when the sanctions are enforced against lawbreaking
employers, the penalties imposed tend to be small ($250 to $2000 per unautho-
rized worker for first-time offenders)2 '0 and difficult to collect. The administra-
tive fine structure provided for in Section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality
Act allows an employer who has received a Notice of Intent to Fine to request a
hearing before'an administrative law judge.21" Because of the costs required to defend
the fines in administrative proceedings, INS (and now ICE) often negotiate with
employers to substantially lower the amounts of these fines. Between October 1,
1996, and February 1, 1998, INS issued NIFs against 833 employers, seeking $6.1
million in administrative penalties. But as a result of negotiations with employers,
Final Orders were issued against 794 employers for only $4.9 million, and of that
amount, only $2.5 million was actually collected.212 The substantially lower amount
of fines ordered and collected led some ICE officials to complain that the fines do not
provide any meaningful deterrent.
213
209. See Powell & Garcia, supra note 128 and accompanying text.
210. For more details on the administrative fine structure, see 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(e)(4)(A)(i)-(iii);
§ 1324(a)(e)(5); § 1324(a)(f)(1).
211. INA § 274A(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(3) (2000).
212. INS offered several explanations for the low collection amount: (1) employers went out of
business; (2) employers filed for bankruptcy; (3) employers died; or (4) employers moved and could not
be tracked down. GAO, SIGNIFCANTr OBSTACLES EXIST, supra note 170, at 25.
213. GAO, WEAKNESSES HNDER, supra note 144, at 19. In recent years, ICE started using more civil
settlements and criminal charges, instead of administrative fines. In 2005, Wal-Mart agreed to pay $11
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Employers themselves do not seem to view sanctions as having a punitive
effect. In a survey of employers working in immigrant-dependent industries in
southern California, researchers found that 48% of the employers "thought"
they employed unauthorized workers; furthermore, 11% volunteered that they
knowingly hired these workers after the sanctions took effect.2 14 More revealing
than their actual violations is their attitudes toward those violations: employers
believed that their chances of being caught were slim and that given the small
potential fines, the risk was an acceptable business expense. Commented one
personnel director:
[It's] like saying if you go 56 on the freeway and the speed limit's 55, you're in
violation of the law. No foolin'. But, everyday I go 70 until I get caught and when I
get caught I say, "Well, I've been doing this for two years, and I got nailed for a
$100 fine. That's not too bad. That's ten cents a day. I'll continue to go 70.
'
215
b. Private Enforcement Laws. Outside of the context of federal employer
sanctions, determining whether private enforcement laws have had the desired
punitive effect is more difficult to address because, as noted previously, many of
these laws are new or have not been extensively studied. But by drawing
comparisons with federal employer sanctions, some observations are possible.
First, because the punitive effect of private enforcement laws is inextricably
linked with their enforcement, that punitive effect is likely to be undercut by the
enforcement problems that have plagued federal employer sanctions. Those
problems include enforcer confusion about enforcement obligations, fraudulent
documents and their ability to undermine a verification system, and political
ambivalence about committing the financial resources needed for effective
enforcement.
Second, the laws may nonetheless have a strong punitive effect because many
of them impose more substantial penalties than federal employer sanctions. For
example, housing laws impose fines between $50 to $1000 for each day of a
landlord's violation,21 6 and the federal transportation law threatens violators
million in a civil settlement to resolve allegations that independent contractors it had hired to clean its
stores had employed illegal aliens. Twelve of these contractors pled guilty to criminal immigration
charges and agreed to forfeit $4 million in assets. The settlement came about after "immigration
enforcement actions" on October 23, 2003, at more than sixty Wal-Mart stores in twenty-one states, in
which ICE arrested 245 illegal aliens. Press Release, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Agrees To Pay a Record $11 Million To ICE to Settle a Nationwide Worksite
Enforcement Investigation (March 18, 2005), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/
walmart031805.htm. Because this practice of civil settlements and criminal charges is new, its effectiveness in
limiting employment of unauthorized workers is not yet known. GAO, WEAKNssas IN NoE, supra note 144, at
19.
214. Calavita, supra note 158, at 1050-51. The survey was of 103 employers working in the
garment, electronics, hotels, construction, restaurants, food processing, and building and landscape
maintenance industries, conducted in 1987 and 1988. Id. at 1046-47.
215. Id. at 1054.
216. For more information about housing penalties, see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
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who transport undocumented immigrants for financial gain with a fine and up to
ten years in jail.217 The federal government's prosecution of the Golden State
bus company for smuggling made news headlines in large part because of the
size of the penalty extracted: forfeiture of a $2.5 million terminal and $100,000
in cash, as well as guilty pleas from its owners and managers. 21 8
3. Symbolic Impact
a. Federal Employer Sanctions. Measured over time, the real impact of employer
sanctions may be a symbolic one. Before employer sanctions were passed, unautho-
rized workers could be penalized by deportation (either for being illegally present or
being legally present but without authorization to work), but the employers who hired
them faced no legal repercussions whatsoever. In fact, an exemption known as the
Texas Proviso explicitly excluded the hiring of undocumented workers from the
federal harboring statute.219
The sanctions' drafters were eager to correct this legal anomaly. As mentioned
previously, they hoped to reduce the substantive problems of unauthorized employ-
ment and illegal immigration.220 But they were. also concerned about the symbolic
impact of the anomaly. Foremost, the drafters of IRCA wanted to establish the legal
principle that employers could not hire undocumented workers.22 They also wanted
to send a clear message that the United States was serious about asserting its
sovereign authority to control its borders. In introducing IRCA to the Senate in 1985,
Senator Alan Simpson stated, 'The most basic function of a sovereign nation ... is to
control the entry of aliens across its borders and to enforce whatever conditions are
imposed on the aliens who we so allow to enter.,
222
By many indicators, the sanctions have been successful in establishing the illegality
of hiring unauthorized workers. In its 1990 survey of employers, the GAO found that
83% of employers were aware of the law and that 65% reported being in full
compliance with the verification requirements.223 Similarly, a Rand/Urban Institute
study of employers in 1988-89 found that 90% of the employers were aware of
IRCA's requirements and a "comparably large percentage" said they had instituted
verification procedures in hiring.224 Even if self-reported compliance rates may be
217. For more information about transportation penalties, see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
218. The Golden State prosecution is described supra in notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
219. Any person who "willfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields from detection... in any
place ... any alien ... not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or
reside within the United States ... shall be guilty of a felony... (pirovided, however, that for purposes
of this section, employment (including the usual and moral practices incident to employment) shall not
be deemed to constitute harboring." 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3) (1982) (repealed 1986).
220. See supra section ll.A.
221. See supra note 135.
222. Fix & HniL, supra note 135, at 39-40.
223. GAO 1990 DISCRIMINATION REPORT, supra note 15, at 5. GAO received usable responses from
4362 employers, which it projected to reflect a universe of 4.6 million employers. Id. at 28.
224. This study surveyed 184 employers in traditionally immigrant-dependent industries. Fix &
HnL, supra note 135, at 125, 127, 129.
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treated with some skepticism, it is clear from these surveys that employers and
employees at least recognize the principle that unauthorized employment is illegal.
But have employer sanctions been successful in conveying a serious message
about border control? The answer appears to be more mixed. Though employers
and employees recognize the illegality of unauthorized employment, the evi-
dence suggests that the sanctions are circumvented with frequent regularity (that
is, employers, knowingly or unknowingly, continue to hire large numbers of
unauthorized workers).225 Given that sanctions are rarely enforced, result in
only small fines when they are enforced, and are structured in ways designed to
undermine aggressive enforcement, 226 it is hard to believe that the sanctions
send any serious border control message.
Indeed, lukewarm enforcement of employer sanctions seems to send the
opposite message: though the United States claims to be serious about control-
ling illegal immigration, it is not serious enough to dedicate the political and
financial resources necessary to make employer sanctions effective. In its 1994
report to Congress, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (created by
Congress to assess the nation's immigration policies) warned about this credibil-
ity gap. While affirming the importance of reducing the "employment magnet,"
the Commission warned sternly that "[tihe ineffectiveness of employer sanc-
tions, prevalence of fraudulent documents, and continued high numbers of
unauthorized workers ... have challenged the credibility of current worksite
enforcement efforts. 2 27 The nation may sincerely want to control the flow of
people across its borders, but presently, it does not seem seriously committed to
using employer sanctions as a tool to achieve that control.
b. Private Enforcement Laws. Like federal employer sanctions, other private
enforcement laws may find the most success in their symbolic impact. A clear
majority of these laws have been passed at the local level, often with other
anti-illegal-immigration measures (for example, authorizing local police to
enforce federal immigration laws).228 By passing the laws, these communities
are sending several messages: frustration at the federal government's immigra-
tion policies, opposition to illegal immigration, and respect for immigration
laws and the rule of law. The intended audiences are the federal government and
the nation as a whole, undocumented immigrants, and community members.
By several measures, private enforcement laws appear to be having at least
225. See, e.g., section I.B.l.a. for information about border crossings after IRCA as a reflection of
the sanctions' effect.
226. For a description of enforcement problems, see section II.B. 1.b.ii.
227. U.S. COM'nM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, 1994 EXECUTVE SUMMARY xii (1994), available at
http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/exesum94.pdf.
228. Interest in immigration issues is surging among local governments. The National Conference of
State Legislatures reports that in 2006, state legislatures introduced 570 bills related to immigration and
passed 90 of them. Governors in 32 different states signed 84 of these bills into laws. NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGisLATUREs, 2006 STATE LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRATION: ENACTED AND
VETOED (Oct. 31, 2006), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/61mmigEnactedLegis3.htm.
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some of their intended symbolic effect. The laws have received a lot of media
attention and have been described variously as "tough, ' 2 9 intended to "stifle
illegal immigration within their borders, 230 and a "local [immigration] crack-
down."'231 To the extent that undocumented immigrants are leaving jurisdictions
with these laws,232 then arguably the laws have successfully communicated
their message to the immigrants as well. Given the political climate, the federal
government has understandably stayed out of the debate on private enforcement
laws, but individual members of Congress have expressed empathy for the local
233communities.
But besides a tough enforcement message, the laws are also sending mes-
sages of racism, anti-immigrant sentiment, and specifically, animus against
Latinos. Civil rights groups and immigrant rights groups charge that these laws
create a hostile environment, where Latinos, Asians, and others who sound or
look foreign, face discrimination, regardless of their immigration status.
234
Though proponents of private enforcement laws deny that their laws are race- or
ethnicity-based in any way, some of their comments suggest otherwise. In
explaining his rationale for pushing for Valley Park, Missouri's housing law,
Mayor Jeffrey Whitteaker explained, "My main issue is overcrowding. You got
one guy and his wife that settle down here, have a couple of kids, and before
long you have Cousin Puerto Rico and Taco Whatever moving in.' 235 These
discriminatory messages, whether intended or not, dilute the laws' symbolic
impact.
4. The Costs
In assessing the effectiveness of federal employer sanctions and other private
enforcement laws, we need to consider the costs, as well as the benefits. As with
any enforcement scheme, private enforcement laws impose administrative costs
on those charged with enforcement responsibilities---employers, landlords, and
229. Frosch, supra note 205 (describing Colorado's laws).
230. Stephen Deere, Law Puts Valley Park Landlords in a Bind, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 14,
2006, at Al.
231. Barry, supra note 204 (describing Hazleton, Pennsylvania's laws).
232. See supra notes 202-206 and accompanying text.
233. For example, Rep. Todd Akin (R-MO), whose district includes Valley Park, said of its laws: "It
seems to me that they have the jurisdiction to do that. I can see some logic to why they did it." Deere,
supra note 85. In response to a request from Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski (D-PA), the Congres-
sional Research Service analyzed the legality of Hazleton, Pennsylvania's ordinances and concluded
that the ordinances are likely preempted by federal immigration law and may violate federal anti-
discrimination laws. JODY FEDER & MICHAEL GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSED CITY OF HAZLETON ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION RELIEF ACT ORDNANCE 4, 7 (June 29, 2006).
234. See Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Hazleton Residents Sue To Halt Harsh Anti-
Immigrant Law (Aug. 15, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/discriml
26465prs20060815.html (predicting that Hazleton, Pennsylvania's laws will "foster rampant
discrimination").
235. Kristen Hinman, Valley Park to Mexican Immigrants: "Adios, Illegals!", ST. Louis RIvERFRONT
TiMEs, Feb. 28, 2007, available at http://www.riverfronttimes.com2007-02-28/news/valley-park-to-
mexican-imnmigrants-adios-illegals/full#comments.
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so on-who must familiarize themselves with the laws' requirements and then
implement them. But as our experience with federal employer sanctions demon-
strates, private enforcement laws also impose unique costs on those seeking the
restricted benefits. Surveys conducted after the sanctions were passed show that
employers engaged in national-origin and citizenship discrimination in hiring-
for example, not hiring employees who "looked" foreign or had a foreign
accent, for fear that they might be undocumented immigrants.23 6 These findings
of widespread discrimination in the employer sanction context strongly suggest
that discrimination would also occur with private enforcement generally.
a. Federal Employer Sanctions
i. Administrative Costs. Under employer sanctions laws, employers incur ad-
ministrative costs in several ways. First, they have to familiarize themselves
with the 1-9 verification form, fill out a form for each employee hired, and set up
recordkeeping systems to demonstrate compliance. Second, they may spend
time interviewing applicants who are not authorized to work or waiting for
applicants to obtain the required documents.
In its 1990 survey, GAO found that it took employers an average of
7.5 minutes to complete an 1-9 form. If an employer's labor costs were $10
per hour, each form would cost $1.25 to prepare; if all 4.6 million projected
employers in the study population had fully complied, the cost would
have been $69 million in 1998 values.2 37 Adjusted for 2007 values, the costs
would be approximately $1.85 per 1-9 form, with total costs of $102
million.238 In their study, the Rand Corporation and the Urban Institute
found that only 15% of employers actually ascribed costs to administrative
compliance.239
As for costs incurred in interviews and delay, GAO found that approximately
7% of employers who responded to the survey were unable to hire a desired
employee because the employee failed to present the necessary work authoriza-
tion documents. 24 0 The Rand/Urban Institute study found a higher percentage-
over a third of employers-were unable to hire promising applicants because of
documentation problems.24'
Charged by Congress to determine whether these administrative costs pre-
236. GAO 1990 DISCRIMNATON REPORT, supra note 15, at 6.
237. Id. at 110.
238. These adjustments assume the same number of employees and 48% cumulative rate of inflation
between 1990 and 2007. See Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Consumer Price Index, 1913-,
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/data/us/calc/histl9l3.cfm (last visited March 25, 2007) (listing
the annual rate of inflation between 1913 and 2007).
239. This low percentage may have been due to the difficulty of calculating the additional costs of
compliance. Fix & HILL, supra note 135, at 133.
240. GAO 1990 DIscRuuNAToN REPORT, supra note 15, at 111.
241. Fix & Hiu, supra note 135, at 134. This higher percentage can be explained by the study's
focus on employers in immigrant-dependent industries. Id. at 125.
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sented an "unnecessary" regulatory burden for employers, the GAO concluded
that they did not. But the GAO based this conclusion on its earlier determina-
tion that the sanctions had been effective in significantly decreasing the flow
and employment of unauthorized workers:
[T]he principal burden resulting from the sanctions provision (i.e., preparation
of an 1-9) would be unnecessary if it could be proven that the law was
ineffective .... Nearly all the evidence suggests that the IRCA has reduced
illegal immigration and employment. Thus, by our definition, the burden from
the sanctions provision is not unnecessary.
242
However, because the evidence shows that employer sanctions only resulted
in a temporary decrease of unauthorized immigration and employment, then by
the GAO's own definition, the continuing administrative costs they impose are
unnecessary.
ii. Discrimination Costs. When proposals for employer sanctions were first seriously
debated, civil rights groups and other advocates for minority rights were among the
staunchest opponents. Organizations like MALDEF (Mexican American Legal De-
fense and Education Fund) and the Union of Democratic Filipinos warned that
requiring employers to make determinations about the validity of immigration docu-
ments would cause discrimination-intentional and accidental-against lawfully present
foreign workers and U.S. residents and citizens who look or sound foreign.243 These
warnings turned out to be well-founded, as several studies found substantial IRCA-
linked discrimination.
The most comprehensive study was GAO's 1989 survey of employers.
244
Asking employers about their hiring practices taken "as a result of the 1986
immigration law, ' 24 5 GAO concluded that employers engaged in a "serious
pattern of discrimination" as a result of the sanctions.246 Specifically, GAO
242. GAO 1990 DISCRIMINATION REPORT, supra note 15, at 102.
243. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker
Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 955, 958 n.7. The NAACP (National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People) initially supported employer sanctions, on the theory that immigrants
adversely affected job prospects for citizens. But in 1990, seeing the discrimination that sanctions
caused, the organization called for repeal. Raul Yzaguirre, Repeal the Law That Fosters Bias in Hiring,
L.A. TbMES, Aug. 20, 1990, at B5.
244. The GAO sent its questionnaire to 9491 employers drawn from a private firm's list of 5.5
million employers. It then adjusted its sample to 6317 employers because some of those originally
contacted went out of business, could not be located, had no employees, or did its hiring elsewhere. In
the end, 4362 employers returned usable responses, which GAO projected to represent 4.6 million
employers. GAO 1990 DIscMInzATON REPORT, supra note 15, at 27-28.
245. To capture only discriminatory practices linked to IRCA, the survey phrased its questions as
"Which of the following actions, if any, was taken at this location as a result of your firm's
understanding of the 1986 immigration law?" Also, set out in a box at the beginning of the question was
this instruction: "IMPORTANT: CHECK 'YES' ONLY IF ACTION TAKEN WAS A RESULT OF THE
1986 IMMIGRATION LAW." Id. at 120 (emphasis in the original).
246. See GAO 1990 DISCRIMINATION REPORT, supra note 15, at 5.
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found that 461,000 employers (or 10%) engaged in illegal national-origin
discrimination based on a person's foreign appearance or accent.247 GAO also
found that an additional 430,000 employers (9%) engaged in illegal citizenship
248discrimination as a result of the sanctions.
Regarding national-origin discrimination, GAO found that 6.6% of the employ-
ers stopped hiring applicants who looked or sounded foreign; 8.6% only exam-
ined documents of current employees who looked or sounded foreign; 9.8%
required applicants with foreign appearances or accents to produce documents
before making a job offer.24 9 These practices were implemented because employ-
ers suspected that the applicants or employees might be unauthorized. GAO did
not have data on how many authorized workers were affected by these discrimi-
natory practices, but because these employers hired an estimated 2.9 million
workers in 1998, GAO assumed that many authorized workers were, in fact,
affected.25° And as to citizenship discrimination, GAO found equally troubling
patterns: as a result of the sanctions, 14.7% of employers started hiring only
employees born in the United States and 13% stopped hiring employees with
temporary work eligibility (for example, temporary resident aliens).251
Why are employers discriminating? This is a question that the GAO survey
could not address directly, but based on correlations in its data, GAO concluded
that at least some of the discrimination could be attributed to employers'
misunderstanding of or confusion about the law's requirements. Employers
whose answers showed that they discriminated were more likely than employers
who did not discriminate to want a better verification system. Likewise, employ-
ers who discriminated were more likely to report that they did not understand
the law, as compared with employers who did not engage in discrimination.252
This survey has been criticized because it depended solely on employers'
statements to show a rise in IRCA-related discrimination. In an internal GAO
memo, the validity of the survey was questioned because there was no baseline
data to compare discrimination before and after IRCA, and thus no basis
(besides employers' statements) to demonstrate that the discrimination was
caused by IRCA.253
However, other evidence exists to support a finding of IRCA-related discrimi-
nation. Using pre- and post-IRCA data, economists found that Latino workers in
non-agricultural sectors received lower wages after IRCA, a finding consistent
with discrimination (on the theory that employers may demand that workers
247. Id. at 38.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 117, 120.
250. Id. at 6.
251. Id. at 120.
252. Id. at 62-63.
253. Michael Fix, IRCA-Related Discrimination: What Do We Know and What Should We Do?, in
THE PAPER CURTAIN, supra note 181, at 267-68 (citing Memorandum from Eleanor Chelimsky,
Assistant Comptroller for Program Evaluation and Methodology (1990)).
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suspected of being unauthorized work for lower wages to compensate for the
employers' risk in hiring them).254 And in 1989 hiring audits, the Urban
Institute found that foreign-looking or -sounding Hispanics received worse
treatment than their Anglo counterparts, treatment that the researchers attributed
to discrimination. Two-person Hispanic/Anglo teams of young males whose job
characteristics (education, work experience, age, and so forth) were carefully
matched were sent in to apply for the same low-skilled, entry-level jobs.255
Based on the results of 360 hiring audits, the Urban Institute found that:
" Hispanic testers received unfavorable treatment from three of every ten
employers;
" Hispanic testers were three times more likely to encounter unfavorable
treatment when applying for jobs than similarly qualified Anglos;
" Anglos received 33% more interviews than Hispanics; and
" Anglos received 52% more job offers than Hispanics.256
Though this evidence of employment discrimination post-IRCA does not
prove that the discrimination was caused by IRCA, it tells a story that is
consistent with the findings in GAO's 1989 survey: that employers discrimi-
nated against job applicants on the basis of national origin, possibly to avoid
employer sanctions liability.
257
Finally, other studies have also found patterns of employer discrimination
similar to that found in GAO's 1989 survey. In a 1988 survey of 400 employers
in the New York City metropolitan area, the New York State Inter-Agency Task
Force on Immigration Affairs found that 7% of the employers required only
employees who look foreign or "risky" to provide work authorization docu-
25ments. 58 In a 1989 survey of San Francisco employers, researchers found that
12% of the employers had different work authorization procedures for foreign-
born workers than for workers born in the United States.25 9
254. Cynthia Bansak & Steven Raphael, Immigration Reform and the Earnings of Latino Workers:
Do Employer Sanctions Cause Discrimination?, 54 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REv. 275, 275-76 (2001). The
authors compared the wages of non-agricultural Latino workers, who were immediately subject to
employer sanctions, with wages earned by agricultural Latino workers, who were exempt from
employer sanctions for two years, and found substantial declines in the non-agricultural Latino wages.
No similar decline in wages was observed for non-Latino white Workers. Id.
255. HARRY CROSS ET AL., URBAN INST., EMPLOYER HIRING PRACTICES DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF
HISPANIC AND ANGLO JOB SEEKERS 2-3 (1990).
256. Id. at 61-62.
257. The testers were trained to state during their first contact with potential employers that they
were U.S. citizens, to minimize the possibility of citizenship discrimination. Id.
258. Martha Davis et al., Report of the Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York: An Analysis of Discrimination Resulting from Employer
Sanctions and a Call for Repeal, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 711, 719 (1989) (citing NEW YORK STATE
INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE IMMIGRATION REFORM
AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986: A STUDY OF IMPACTS ON NEW YORKERS 9 (1988)).
259. GAO 1990 DISCRIMINATION REPORT, supra note 15, at 83 (citing EMpwEr AD HmNG PRACnCES
UNDER mE IMMIGRATION ReiBRM AND CONTROL ACt OF 1986: A SURVEY OF SAN FRANCISCO BusINEssEs (1989)).
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The discrimination occurred despite provisions in IRCA to fight this very
kind of discrimination. Section 274B makes it an "unfair immigration-related
employment practice" to discriminate against someone in hiring or firing on the
basis of national origin or citizenship status.260 These anti-discrimination provi-
sions were part of a necessary political compromise between supporters and
opponents of employer sanctions to insure the sanctions' passage.26'
If, after an administrative hearing, an employer is found by a preponderance
of the evidence to have violated the statute, it may be subject to a cease and
desist order, be required to keep more extensive employment records, pay fines
between $250 and $2000 for each individual discriminated against (for first-
time offenders), be required to hire individuals "directly and adversely af-
fected," or take other remedial action.262
But there are important restrictions in Section 274B which may make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to use. First, only a "protected individual" may bring a
claim of citizenship discrimination. Protected individuals are defined as U.S.
citizens, lawful permanent residents, and those admitted as refugees or granted
asylum; however, the non-citizens have to apply for naturalization within six
months of eligibility or be granted citizenship within two years after applying
for naturalization.263 In other words, only citizens and those actively pursuing
citizenship can bring citizenship discrimination claims, with the result that those
who may more likely experience citizenship discrimination (like long-term
permanent residents) will be unable to seek redress.
Another restriction on citizenship discrimination claims is the exception that
allows employers to hire an "equally qualified" citizen over a non-citizen
without violating the law. 264 So even if a non-citizen fits into a "protected
individual" category as described above, her ability to bring a citizenship
discrimination claim is limited. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, adminis-
trative decisions have interpreted Section 274B as requiring proof of intentional
discrimination by employers, thus effectively rejecting all disparate impact
claims. These interpretations'in turn relied on controversial statements made by
President Ronald Reagan when he signed IRCA into law.26 5
It is important to note that studies documenting IRCA discrimination were done in
the three- to four-year period after IRCA became law. Without follow-up studies, it is
difficult to know what current discrimination issues and patterns are. But that such
substantial evidence of discrimination exists should give us pause as we consider the
effectiveness and advisability of other private enforcement laws.2
260. INA § 274B(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (2000).
261. Simpson, supra note 28, at 590.
262. INA § 274B(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2) (2000).
263. INA § 274B(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3) (2000).
264. INA § 274B(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(4) (2000).
265. See STEmpIN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1227-29 (4th ed. 2005).
266. The implications of past IRCA discrimination patterns for private enforcement laws generally
are explored supra section H.B.4.b.
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b. Private Enforcement Laws
i. Administrative Costs. With so many different types of private enforcement
laws and so many different private parties subject to enforcement obligations,
we would expect high administrative costs for implementation. Each private
enforcer has to spend time and money to understand the laws' requirements,
train employees to implement the requirements, develop a system for maintain-
ing immigration records, and respond to inquiries and complaints from govern-
ment entities.
Outside the context of federal employer sanctions, there is no centralized
source of information or training to assist the private enforcers. Thus administra-
tive costs are likely higher than those incurred to enforce federal employer
sanctions. In fact, none of the other private enforcement laws makes any
provision for training enforcers about their obligations. Even if there was
political will to provide training, there would be no way to make the training
uniform, to make sure that all enforcers are receiving the same accurate
immigration training to avoid enforcement mistakes. This decentralization is the
predictable downside of private enforcement's multiplier effect.
ii. Discrimination Costs. Discrimination, based on national origin, citizen-
ship, and even race, is the heaviest cost of private enforcement and the most
compelling reason to avoid their use. GAO attributed at least some of the
discrimination it found to employer confusion about their obligations under
federal employer sanctions.2 67 For other private enforcement laws, we should
expect even more private enforcer confusion because there is no government
guidance or training on how to enforce these laws. Thus, extrapolating from our
experience with federal employer sanctions, we should expect even higher
levels of enforcer discrimination for other private enforcement laws.
And to the extent that enforcers discriminate for fear of legal liability, we
should also expect higher enforcer discrimination in this current anti-immigrant
climate. In a 2006 review of major public opinion polls, the Pew Hispanic
Center found that a significant majority of Americans believe that illegal
immigration is a very serious problem (57% to 68%, depending on the poll);
2 68
furthermore, a sizeable minority believes that undocumented immigrants should
be deported.269 Taken together, these numbers suggest a national atmosphere
267. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
268. PEw HIsPANIc SURVEY, THE STATE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRATION IN SPRING 2006,
at 4-5 (May 17, 2006).
269. Id. at 7-10. The Pew Hispanic Center reported that
[a] majority of Americans appears to favor measures that would allow illegal immigrants currently in
the U.S. to remain in the country either as permanent residents and eventual citizens or as temporary
workers who will have to go home eventually. When those options are presented, only a minority
favors deporting all illegal immigrants or otherwise forcing them to go home.
Id. at 1. It should be noted, however, that the minorities who favor deportation still represent a sizeable
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where immigration concerns run high. Particularly in local communities that have
taken the initiative to pass private enforcement laws, private parties should therefore
expect vigorous enforcement of these laws by motivated local governments.27°
Finally, in an anti-immigrant climate, we could also expect to see more
discrimination caused by plain, old-fashioned animus. Private enforcement laws
can certainly not be blamed for creating this animus, but they do provide the
perfect cover: enforcers already biased against a certain group can use the laws
as an excuse to refuse to provide benefits to people from that group. And
because none of the laws, except for federal employer, sanctions, provides a
remedy against discrimination, 27 enforcers can be fairly confident that they will
not face repercussions for the discrimination.
CONCLUSION
At first glance, private enforcement of immigration laws has a lot of intuitive
appeal-additional enforcement by thousands of private parties, "on the cheap,"
to deter illegal immigration and help us regain control of our borders. This
appeal helps to explain the expansion of private enforcement laws into employ-
ment, housing, transportation, and other areas.
But the reality of our twenty-one-year experience with federal employer
sanctions provides sobering lessons about the potential effectiveness of these
laws. Implemented nationally with substantial federal resources, these sanctions
have not resulted in any permanent decrease in illegal immigration. Rather, the
effectiveness of federal employer sanctions has been undermined by numerous
enforcement problems: enforcer confusion about enforcement obligations, the
pervasiveness of fraudulent documents, and lack of political will to enforce the
sanctions. As documented by GAO studies, perhaps most damning has been the
national-origin and citizenship discrimination that employers engaged in as a
result of the sanctions.
Drawing from these lessons, we can conclude that the benefits of private
enforcement laws are mostly symbolic (sending tough enforcement messages),
rather than substantive (actually deterring illegal immigration). Diffusing enforce-
ment responsibilities among many private parties, without providing adequate
training or resources, leads to predictable enforcement problems. At the same
time, the laws extract real costs in terms of discrimination against those who
look or appear foreign. Governments, particularly local governments, may find
private enforcement laws politically appealing, but a realistic weighing of the
true costs and benefits of private enforcement laws counsels against their use.
portion of the population, 18% (USA Today/Gallup) to 47% (Time Magazine Poll). Id. at 8.
270. If these other private enforcement laws encounter enforcement problems similar to those
experienced by federal employer sanctions, we might expect that enforcer fears about liability-and
discrimination linked to those fears-would decrease. Even if that is the case, we would still expect to
see liability-linked discrimination in the early period of the laws' enforcement.
271. For more on the anti-discrimination provisions of federal employer sanctions, see supra notes
261-65 and accompanying text.
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